March 31, 2008

Cuba lifts ban on locals staying in hotels

[Thanks to Ghettodefender for this link]

frobles@MiamiHerald.com

Havana's historic Hotel Nacional in 2006.
FOR THE MIAMI HERALD
Havana's historic Hotel Nacional in 2006.

Cuba's so-called ''tourism apartheid'' -- which has long prohibited locals from staying at hotels -- ends midnight Monday, according to news agencies in Havana.

The move ends a ban that many Cubans had fixated on as a prime example of the inequities and hardships they faced under Fidel Castro's regime. The lifting comes five weeks after Fidel Castro's brother, Raúl, took over the nation's presidency, and just days after he ended the ban on Cubans owning personal mobile phones, computers and household appliances.

But the measure is largely symbolic: a night's stay at a luxury hotel in Cuba can cost more than $200 -- which is just about what the average Cuban earns in a year.

Cubans were prohibited from staying at hotels even if someone else paid the tab.

Reuters news agency reported Monday that now Cubans can also rent cars and go to beaches once restricted to tourists.

U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, the ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a fierce critic of the Castro government, called the lifting of the hotel restrictions ``pathetic.''

''There might be many superficial changes like this hotel maneuver and making DVD players and computers legal, but what the Cuban people want are true changes, like freedom and democracy,'' she said in an e-mail. ''Raúl may make these nominal rather than real changes because most Cubans can't afford hotel stays. ``What a dismal picture that legalizing microwaves and hotel stays are considered reforms,'' she said. ``It's pathetic.''

But those who are pushing for an easing of sanctions on Cuba had a different take on Raúl Castro's reforms. Many experts view Raúl Castro's early decisions as positive steps, even if they do not come with democratic elections and freedom of speech.

''This is a real reform, because it speaks to the desire of Cubans to have more autonomy over their own lives,'' said Sarah Stephens, the director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, an advocacy organization that takes lawmakers on trips to the island. ``It is part of a piece with cellphones and agrarian reforms, and when the Cuban government allows more private decisions, that is something our government should recognize and applaud. It doesn't, but it should.''

Carlos Saladrigas, the co-chairman of the moderate Cuba Study Group, said the lifting of the hotel restriction was ''a very positive move'' by Raúl Castro but noted that without more economic reforms ``the tourist apartheid will shift from a political apartheid to an economic apartheid.''

'None of these measures put food on Cubans' tables,'' he said. ``That's what's really needed.''

Reuters and the Associated Press news agencies interviewed hotel managers who said they were informed that any Cuban with a national ID card could check in starting Monday night.

Like other guests, they will be charged in convertible pesos worth 24 times the regular pesos earned by state employees, the AP reported.

There was no official announcement in state-controlled media on the lifting of the ban on hotel rooms and other tourist services, and word-of-mouth spread slowly through the Cuban capital.

Inside the world-renowned luxurious but somewhat run-down Hotel Nacional, it was business as usual, Havana news outlets reported. Receptionists at several other hotels reported no immediate spike in reservations, the AP said.

Other tourism employees said they had not yet been officially informed of the change.

Aljazeera Interview: Evo Morales


Morales, far right, is close to Hugo Chavez, left and Fidel Castro, former Cuban leader [EPA]

Bolivia's president, Evo Morales, was born in one of the poorest parts of the country and became prominent as a leader of coca farmers. Two years ago he became the first Aymara indigenous Indian to be elected president of the nation.

At present he is facing fierce opposition from provinces demanding autonomy, and some are even threatening to break away from the country, however Morales remains as determined as ever to forge ahead with his proposals, including a push for a new constitution granting more power to the country's indigenous majority.

Lucia Newman, Al Jazeera's Latin America editor, spoke to the Bolivian leader.

First I'd like to start by asking about your very ambitious program to try to redress the centuries of discrimination and oppression against Bolivia's indigenous majority, which you have compared to apartheid in South Africa. It hasn't been easy for you, though, has it?

President Evo Morales: Thank you for inviting me. Our government, with the support of our social movements, has implemented policies that make it possible to diminish the profound differences between families and regions, allowing us to repair the injustices of so many years of inequality.

But I'm very sorry to say that there are certain groups and families that resist the social policies we're implementing. The story of Bolivia is of internal and external colonialism, which always held the political and economic power here. And taking that power away from them has a price.

The great advantage is that those people who decided to transform all this, continue to support our programme of change within democracy and above all with great openness before our people and the international community.

I know there is this resistance, from those who want a Bolivia in which they can continue to accumulate wealth [and] continue to keep sacking the land and its resources, its natural resources. Their only interest in the people is to have them to exploit. Those are the profound differences we have with some conservative groups in Bolivia.

I've been surprised to hear you speak very often about racism, do you still feel discriminated against, even now that you are president of Bolivia?

As a trade union leader and leader of peasant movements, I witnessed and had to endure racism. And I thought that once I was in the presidency that would stop. But the racism from the groups I have mentioned has only increased.

The things that some opposition groups and leaders are saying against the indigenous movement are increasingly more radical. For example, the governor of Santa Cruz referred to President Hugo Chavez [of Venezuela] as the chief monkey, meaning that the other monkey, the other ape, was Evo Morales.

To think that in this new millennium we can be referred to as animals is unacceptable. But it's the colonial mentality of these people, who cannot accept that the indigenous people have the same rights as any other Bolivian in this country.

But there are people, though, who do not consider themselves indigenous, who consider themselves mestizos, of European descent, who accuse you of actually practicing reverse racism, of promoting hatred amongst different races rather than governing for all Bolivians. What do you say to that?

It seems that it's a crime to seek social justice [and] equality among all Bolivians. Historically those who have been most abandoned have been the peasants and if you work to help them you are accused of being racist.

Morales has faced opposition from
eastern states demanding autonomy [EPA]
Our economic policies are for every Bolivian, not just for one sector. But if we do not resolve the problem of the indigenous people, who make up the majority of the population, it is impossible to think that there will be social justice in our country.

So each and every one of us should seek to repair the damage done over so many years ... and so now, it's the racists who are accusing us of practicing racism.

When they have no other argument, they try to twist things before the international community. But there are witnesses, especially the diplomats. When I talk to European, Asian or Latin American ambassadors, for example, they all recognise the work we are doing to secure equality in Bolivia.

I'd like to talk to you now about your new constitution. This is it, it's a major step in any country to have a new Magna Carta, but this one was approved by your supporters without the participation of most of the opposition. You consider that democratic?

It was nevertheless approved by the majority of the constituent assembly.

But without the opposition taking part.

Some opposition groups were there, PODEMOS, and some other small groups, everyone took part except one party, the MNR, and another small party.

Every other political and social group helped write the new constitution. But anyway, whether the majority of the opposition participated or not, the problem is that these conservative groups don't want democratic transformations. They do not want peaceful change, especially if it means promoting equality.

What article can they object to in that constitution? Absolutely none.

Maybe the part that deals with autonomy. But the new constitution guarantees autonomy, which the majority of Bolivians have voted in favor of in a referendum. The only thing, as you point out, is that the constitution was not approved by the majority of the opposition.

Let the world tell us, let our opponents tell us, what articles do they object to ? None. According to international analysts, this is one of the most progressive constitutions in terms of social policies, That's what we wanted, to bring about profound transformations in our society in democracy. Peacefully.

And the new constitution seeks equality for all Bolivians.

We are such a diverse society. Like you, with blue eyes ... there are Bolivians with blue and green eyes, there are people with black skin, dark brown, mestizos ... I always say, we are all Bolivians, but there are Bolivians who've been here for centuries and Bolivians who're more contemporary.

Those who've been here the longest, the indigenous people, are the majority and they are the poorest, and the others, who are the minority, are the richest.

Our constitution seeks to equalise these two groups. Because we are all Bolivians.

Nevertheless, President Morales, this country seems to be on a collision course between the West, most of those your supporters, and the east, provinces that are in some cases are even threatening to secede from the nation if you do not agree to give them the autonomy, the type of autonomy they are seeking. Is there any middle ground here, I know that you've asked for the mediation of the Catholic Church.

No, it's not a matter of west against east, it's groups, the oligarchy from the east against the policies we are implementing. There are many social groups in the East that support our policies. That is one of my government's greatest advantages. Before the social movements were always against the government, now they support it.

We said we would guarantee autonomy, but these oligarchical groups confuse autonomy with independence, with secession. And we are right.

Now, what's the real problem? Before those who are now demanding autonomy were in the government, they governed for the last 180 years since we became a republic. They didn't want autonomy then.

Now, when they lost control of the government, they don't know how to keep sucking the blood of the Bolivian people, so they want autonomy for their provinces.

We say fine, let's have provincial autonomy, indigenous autonomy, municipal autonomy, and they don't want all that. I repeat, its not the whole region that wants to separate. The autonomy they seek implies a division of this country, and the government will insist on the unity of the nation.

I'd like to ask you now, what will you do, if Santa Cruz, the department or the province that is one of the richest in this country, makes good on its threat to go ahead with an autonomy referendum in just about one month. You say this is illegal. Would you send in troops to stop it?

No, for now we are betting on dialogue. We know this is tremendous concern about this among the Bolivian people, not just the national government.

We are betting on a dialogue to prevent Bolivia from being divided up. It's the responsibility of our institutions and also of the international organisations. Thankfully, I have received messages from the international community, saying they will never recognize this separatism. And its our job to find a peaceful solution through dialogue.

And if that does not work?

I haven't thought of that. I have faith this will be resolved through dialogue.

You recently said that the United States government was pushing to try to turn Bolivia into a kind of Kosovo. What proof do you have of that?

First the American congressmen that visited me recently asked me to support that division of Kosovo. It's impossible that we can support the division of a country. Secondly, the conspiracy against my government is headed by the US ambassador.

USAID, with funds that come American tax payers, who think they are helping the Bolivian people, is using the money in a dirty campaign against my government and especially against me. They meet with NGOs and other groups here, always with the intention of conspiring. They offer them money on condition that they take part in the campaign against Evo Morales.

The mayor of a city, who recently visited me, told me he was offered money by the USAID agency to run as an opposition congressman. They even offered to pay for his campaign.

And the mayor told me that the people who work for the US agency go from house to house telling people that if they get rid of Evo Morales, they will have more money. If we wanted to document this we could. We are going to present the documents to prove this to the US Congress.

You are a staunch admirer of Cuba's former president Fidel Castro, also a close friend of Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez. How much - or how similar - is your revolution, to theirs?

We are very different countries with very different political processes. But all together, we are pushing for greater social justice.

The goal is the same. I remember in 2002, President Fidel, in a big international conference, said "Don't do what I did." He referred to the armed struggle. He said, do what Chavez did. He won through the ballot box, he won an election and guaranteed transformations and a new political constitution for Venezuela.

The president has strong support from
Bolivia's indigenous community [AFP]
And I understood that today its no longer the people who take up arms against the empire, but rather the empire that is using weapons against the people. Here we have said no to weapons, and yes to the ballot box to achieve profound changes. Therefore the democracies we are seeing today in Latin America are liberationist, not submissive to the empire.

Yesterday I mentioned in an interview with another journalist that I was very satisfied with the recent Rio Group Summit, where amongst ourselves, we Latin Americans have resolved a problem, a conflict in our region .

Before, who resolved all this? The government of the United States. We are beginning to leave all that behind us, that the United States can be like a giant referee or like a big owner that comes to decide our problems. And I feel Latin America is advancing a lot in its democratic path of liberation, of dignity, and we will continue to do this.

Before there was only one big nation, the United States. Then came Venezuela, with a leader like Hugo Chavez, and now there are others, with their own reality. For example, I respect Lula [Brazil's president Lula Inacio Lula da Silva] tremendously. He is working for the poor.

And there are others who are making great efforts. For example, Argentina five or six years ago it was a country that was falling apart. Then came President [Nestor] Kirchner, he put the country back on its feet, respecting private poverty.

In Venezuela they also respect private property. And in the new constitution of Bolivia, we also guarantee private property. I can't remember which article it is. But you see, we are so diverse, not just physically but also economically, too. So we respect three types of economy: private, public and collective property.

This is something very advanced. That's our reality. There may be some differences, but the goals are the same. That's where we all agree.

Well let me be the devil's advocate. The Bush administration has said that you, President Castro and President Chavez form an Axis of Evil of South America. So I ask you, explain if you can your new friendship with Iran. The Iranian president in fact came all the way to Bolivia. What is the basis of that relationship that you are forging?

Look, the world and humanity will be the judge of who forms the Axis of Evil. As far as I know, Cuba doesn't send troops anywhere to take lives. We have Cuban doctors here who save lives. But before we had American soldiers who killed people. In the protest meetings there were American soldiers, with uniforms,who fired against us, they fired at us.

While the Bush administration sends troops to kill people, Iran for example, does not. That's the big difference. Iran and Bolivia have signed a number of accords in the area of co-operation, investment. Our culture is one of dialogue and we have the right to broaden our diplomatic relations with the countries who cooperate and help our people. And our accords have nothing to do with killing people.

What sort of accords are you reaching?

I repeat, agreements of cooperation and investment, to resolve our social problems, in the area of fossil fuel and agriculture, earmarked at meeting social demands of our people.

Let me finish by asking you, where do you see your country ten years from now. This is the poorest country in South America but you have tremendous wealth, natural gas, for example. Ten years from now where will this country be?

At the pace we are going Bolivia will improve, but if the exponents of free markets return, or the conservatives, who only want to use our people to exploit them, who only want our land , our Pacha Mama, to sack it, then Bolivia will remain as in the past.

Thanks to the change of our fossil fuel law and the nationalisation of our fossil fuels, our economy is doing very well. Just one example: In 2005 our international reserves were 1.7 billion dollars. Today we have more than six billion dollars, in 2003 and 2004 we never had more than one billion dollars in reserves. In two years we've grown enormously.

Therefore, Bolivia is trustworthy, Bolivia is viable, and not like before, when they used to say: "Bolivia is unviable." Unviable because our economic model was one of sacking of our resources. Now we have policies for structural transformations, but also social transformations.

So, 10 years from now, at this rate, Bolivia will no longer be at the bottom of the list in South America. In fact in some areas we are no longer at the bottom.

In 2006, when I became president, Bolivia had the lowest international reserves in the region, now there are three or four others who have less than us. And so on, I could mention others.

But most of all prosperity means attending to our nation's social problems.

March 30, 2008

Military Crisis in South America: The Results of Plan Colombia

Raúl Zibechi - 3/31/2008

The military operative executed by Colombian soldiers on Ecuadorian soil to kill the FARC commander Raul Reyes is part of the strategy of the United States to alter the military balance in the region. In the crosshairs is Venezuelan and Ecuadorian oil; however it also serves as a check on Brazil as an emerging regional power.

In official declarations, the objective of the operative is the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or rather narco-terrorism. But in reality, the Colombian-American military operative that violated the sovereignty of Ecuador is directed specifically at Hugo Chavez. What we are witnessing could be the first phase of a vast offensive to destabilize the "Bolivarian Revolution" and to alter the relationship between the powers in South America. This strategy has been implemented in stages. First there was Plan Colombia, intended to strengthen the military capacity of the Colombian state and place it among the most powerful on the continent. Next came the "spilling over" of the internal war into neighboring countries. The third stage seems to be "pre-emptive war," which has become the Pentagon's most widely used military strategy since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

This is the first time in a long time that Washington has taken the offensive in the region, and it is capable of putting a significant portion of Latin American countries behind its strategy. It is also a show of force during moments in which Chavez is encountering serious internal difficulties and is unable to receive support for this strategy of responding to tension with more tension.

The first thing that stands out is the lack of decency of those involved. The FARC present themselves as a revolutionary and popular organization, when in reality they are an armed group that violates human rights, recruits minors for its ranks, abuses women and the hostages that they maintain in their power, and are financed thanks to drug trafficking (see sidebar). Many countries consider them a terrorist organization.

On the other side, president Alvaro Uribe Vélez has integrated drug trafficking and was aided by paramilitary groups, as it appears in the U.S. National Security Archive. This finding was revealed by Newsweek in 2004. There it was established that in the 1990's Uribe had a role in the Medellin cartel, which was commanded by his close friend Pablo Escobar.1 This is the kind of person whom on March 4 George W. Bush called "our democratic ally." Uribe has become the main operator of White House policies in the region.

New Regional Balance of Power



In 2004 the Brazilian magazine Military Power Review made a list of South American armed forces including all of the variables—from the amount of available soldiers and the quality of the units/training to defense plans and strategic projection. The analysis established a score for each nation according to its military might. Brazil came in first place with 653 points, followed by Peru with 423, Argentina with 319, and Chile with 387. Next came another group in which Colombia had 314, followed by Venezuela with 282, and Ecuador with 254.2 At that time, which was approximately four years ago, the difference in favor of Brazil's armed forces was considerable while two relatively equal groupings of countries followed.

In 2007 the same magazine reported information on the amount of soldiers of the different armed forces in each country using figures from the previous year. The statistics taken from the armies concludes that Colombia, with 178,000 soldiers, has moved into second place on the continent, very close to Brazil (190,000 soldiers). In just a few years, the military might of Colombia has climbed the rankings at an exponential rate. That same year France's army had 137,000 troops and Israel's had 125,000. In 2008, there are already 210,000 troops on the ground in Colombia, overtaking Brazil, which has a population four times that of Colombia, and seven times more territory. The military expenditure of Colombia is the highest on the continent: 6.5% of Gross Domestic Product, much higher than that of the United States (4%), NATO countries (2%), and the rest of South America (1.5-2%).

If we observe the progression of the Colombian armed forces, its growth is astonishing. In 1948, when the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán initiated the period in Colombian history known as La Violencia, there were 10,000 soldiers. In 1974, there were 50,675, which would rise to 85,900 in 1984, during which time the beginning of peace negotiations to demobilize various armed groups had begun. In 1994 there were 120,000 troops, a number that was raised to 160,000 during the first phases of Plan Colombia. Presently, the three branches of the armed forces have 270,000 uniformed members, not to mention 142,000 police officers. In total, there are more than 400,000 armed men and women in seven divisions, with a Rapid Deployment Division and an Elite Anti-terrorist Forces division.3

In 2007 alone the Colombian army created 52 new units. They received donations of Black Hawk helicopters from the United States, bought 13 fighter planes from Israel, and 25 Super Tucano fighter planes from Brazil in 2006. The Colombian armed forces are superior to those of its two neighbors. The ratio of troops is 6:1 with Venezuela and 11:1 with Ecuador. But the main difference is in the training: Colombian troops have been trained in jungle combat and can count on the logistical backing of Washington.4

In only a few years, there has been a drastic change in military power in South America. It is the result of Plan Colombia. Under the guise of combating the FARC and drug smuggling, since August of 2000, when the U.S. Congress approved Plan Colombia, the recipient of the plan has received over $5 billion dollars in military assistance. Add to that Uribe's government's application of special taxes to those with the highest income in order to arm the armed forces. Transport and attack helicopters, light armor, infrared goggles, pipeline protection, swift boats, turbo-powered airplanes with ground-attack capabilities, spy planes, and air traffic control and radar to follow illegal flights are the principal purchases.5

Getting the Neighbors Involved



In 2003, sociologist James Petras pointed out that the main worry of the U.S. Southern Command, who is the real architect behind regional politics, is that "Colombia's neighbors (Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Brazil), who are suffering the same adverse effects of neoliberal politics, shift politically against the military domination and the economic interests of the United States."6 This is why the strategy thought up for Plan Colombia does not consist so much in winning the internal war as it does in spilling it over into neighboring countries as a form of neutralizing their growing autonomy from Washington. Militarizing the relationships between nations is always a good business for whoever supports the hegemony with military superiority. In this sense, the FARC play a functional role in Washington's war plans.

Ecuador's president Rafael Correa mentioned that the cost of controlling the border with Colombia, where there were some 10,000 soldiers stationed before the events of March 1, is more than $100 million dollars per year. Colombia does not control this border and pushes the guerilla forces toward Ecuadorian soil, as a way of creating instability. In recent years, Ecuador has dismantled some 40 FARC campgrounds at its border and has voiced dozens of complaints for the fumigation of supposed coca crops that end up affecting Ecuadorians who live at the border.

Brazil had already decided to make its border impermeable during the presidency of Fernando Hernique Cardoso. In response to the Clinton administration's attempt to involve Brazil in the objectives of Plan Colombia, in 2000 Plan Cobra was launched (initiated by Brazil and Colombia) to prevent the war in Colombia from spilling over into the Brazilian Amazon, and Plan Calha Norte to prevent guerrillas and drug smugglers from crossing the border.7 Control of the Andean region is considered key for U.S. hegemony on the continent, as much for political reasons as for the mineral wealth that it contains. It allows U.S. corporations to regain the territory lost since the 1990s when they were partially displaced by multinational European corporations; it would also assure that the supposed benefits of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas would impede other emerging powers (Brazil, but also China and India as well), from gaining a favorable position in the region.

And there is always the question of oil. In 1973, the United States imported 36% of its oil needs. Today, the United States imports 56% of all crude oil that it consumes. Venezuela is the fourth largest provider, who provides the United States with 15% of its necessities, and Colombia is the fifth.8 Assuring the continued flow of this energy source requires territorial control of this enclave with a military presence on the ground.

The Destabilization of Venezuela



Since the blow to Chavez's government in the referendum to reform the constitution on Dec. 4, 2007, the internal and regional tension has come to the forefront. As many analysts predicted, the economic crisis appears to be out of control and is generating problems between the government and the population.9 Now seems like the right time to attempt to destabilize Venezuela.

In effect, evidence indicates that Reyes, the most visible face of the FARC for his status as negotiator, had been located in previous occasions, but it was never decided to attack him. The decision to unleash an action of this type and at this moment has various interpretations. On one side, it takes advantage of the internal situation in Venezuela, and also undermines Correa's ability to govern at a time when his program of change, which includes state control of oil as one of its axes, and a solitary alliance with Brazil as an essential supporter, has just gotten underway.

A destabilization in the region would also have very harmful effects for Brazil, the emerging regional power that is coming out stronger from the current world economic crisis. In 2007 Brazil had an 84% increase in direct foreign investments compared to 2006 and in January of 2008 investments were double what they were in the same month one year ago. With this in mind, the magazine Exame published a report indicating that "the country is currently experiencing its best economic times in three decades" and that it has the opportunity to "enter among the elite of world capitalism."10

Occupying this position requires removing others from it. In other words, Brazil is filling the void that the growing weakness of Washington is leaving in the region. For this reason the chancellor's office is hoping for peace: both to promote business and to limit the effects of militarism, which is always the best "business" for a super-power in decline. Clovis Brigagao, director of the Center of American Studies at Cándidos Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro, pointed out that the present is "a unique opportunity" to establish a collective mediation similar to the Contadora group that promoted the pacification of Central America in the 1980s.11

Finally, Venezuela is suffering a type of destabilization that can serve as a model of reference for other countries. Julio García Jarpa, senator of Táchira state, on the border with Colombia, has observed the extension in Venezuela on the paramilitary phenomenon. "Because of the demobilization of paramilitaries in Colombia, certain groups have concentrated on the border with the Venezuelan states of Apure, Zulia, Mérida, Táchira, and Trujillo."12 From there they smuggle gasoline, hoard food supplies, and help create insecurity, corrupting local officials and generating a climate of violence.

Those states make up a third of the country, have the most important hydrocarbon resources, and, according to one claim by the Venezuelan senator, are included in a secession plan similar to that which is developing in the Bolivian departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija. After the recent events in Kosovo, where independence promoted by the West appears linked to the oil business, the theory that the Venezuelan right, defended by U.S. interests, are promoting the secession in the western region does not seem far-fetched.

At the same time, the information that has recently come to light allows the conclusion that a good part of Chavez's complaints about a conspiracy against his government are not just a figment of his imagination. The issue at hand is how to contain the tendencies toward war and how to put a stop to the polarization. In this sense, Brazilian diplomacy continues to show signs of common sense and know-how. They have not signaled out one party as the aggressor, but they have implicated the North in a plan to create a stable peace, based on regional integration, within the region. For this reason, the construction of the South American Community of Nations is more urgent than ever.

End Notes

Broken Barricades: The Oaxaca Rebellion in Victory, Defeat, and Beyond

by Collective Reinventions


The following text is the result of a collaborative effort, and is the fruit of a considerable number of meetings and discussions. It reflects the give and take, even the hesitations, of an ongoing conversation. It should also be noted at the outset that this essay makes no pretense of being a definitive account of the Oaxaca rebellion, nor is it the product of a directly observed or lived experience of the events themselves. Like all significant historical events, there are many truths - instead of one Absolute Truth - to be discovered in the Oaxaca rebellion. In any case, this analysis was written at a literal distance from the unrest in Mexico in the period under discussion here. While the text is unashamedly partisan, in the sense of taking the side of the Oaxacan rebels, and specifically the most radical among them, it is not a work of mere advocacy or apologetics. Still less does it represent the kind of ventriloquism common to the left: it does not speak for Oaxaca, which can most certainly speak for itself. It seeks to afford some perspective on the rebellion, and to reveal some of the roots of a complex phenomenon, and nothing more.

It is written after the apogee of the Oaxaca rebellion, but with the certainty that this movement is not over, that in one form or another the struggle that began in 2006 will continue. Our analysis is presented in the hope that will shed some light on Oaxaca before the uprising is mythologized (by anti-authoritarians); distorted (by all the Leninist vanguards who, in their arrogance, are eager to impart their stern “lessons” to the “masses” in Oaxaca); or simply fades away, far from the glare of the proverbial media spotlight.

I

“Since all of this, we will not be the same at all as before; we can’t be and we don’t want to be.”
-- Oaxacan resident quoted in La batalla por Oaxaca (Ediciones Yope Power, Oaxaca: 2007)

For the last half of 2006, and continuing well into 2007, the city of Oaxaca, Mexico was the epicenter of a rebellion that defied both the the Mexican state and its local incarnation, the governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz. In this defiance, the social movement that emerged in Oaxaca challenged other nexes of power, capital, and class within Mexico, assuming a markedly anti-hierarchical and, over time, anti-systemic cast. As it grew, expanding well beyond its initial focus and demands, the uprising in Oaxaca also dispelled conventional notions of centrality and importance tied to quantitative criteria: a provincial capital in the second poorest state in Mexico (after Chiapas), a city best known beyond its borders as a tourist destination, became for a time the focus of considerable attention on the part of radical opinion throughout the world.

While it shared certain characteristics with the Zapatista movement in neighboring Chiapas - most importantly in its strong orientation toward indigenous peoples and the defense of their common lands and traditions - it also differed from the EZLN in other signficant ways. The Oaxacan movement arose in an urban environment, even as it drew support from (and embodied the concerns of) the rural, largely Indian communities in the Oaxacan hinterland. Also, unlike the Zapatistas, it had no army, only crowds of determined men and women, supported at key moments by contingents of youths willing to fight the police in the streets of the city.

Crucially, in Oaxaca there was no charismatic leader in the mold of the voluble Subcomandante Marcos (1). Instead, there was a reference - stated again and again in the discourse of the movement - to the fact that this was a movement de los de abajo, of those “from below,” meaning both that the participants primarily came from the base of the Mexican social pyramid but also that the movement itself was controlled by its rank-and-file and not by those who sought to become its “leaders.” The rebellion found organized expression in an assembly, and did so in the plural, not the singular. Not only did it give itself the name of the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca, it was a movement in a near-permanent state of assembly, or rather assemblies, at least in its beginning phase.

Beyond the question of the movement’s form - reminiscent of the traditions of direct democracy dear to the anti-authoritarian left - there is also, of course, one of its content. Here, one treads cautiously. While many reports on the Oaxaca uprising have stressed its radicalism, its innovativeness, its status as the “first rebellion of the 21st century,” these claims have often been made in the facile, overblown language that is the hallmark of leftist triumphalism (2). Such accounts of the movement often read like a morality play in which the noble People - who, in the naïve chant of Latin American militancy, “will never be defeated” - fight valiantly against Evil Incarnate (Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, the Mexican state, Yankee imperialism). Given the realities of Oaxaca, its grinding poverty and its brutal, corrupt authorities, such a depiction is not without its aspects of verisimilitude. But it hardly does justice to the complexities of the Oaxacan rebellion, and provides little basis for a discussion of its implications.

Other more critical, but equally shrill voices pointed out the weaknesses, the contradictions, the insufficiencies of the rebellion. The arid Marxists of the International Communist Current dispensed their usual verdict on all such uprisings: not “proletarian” enough. Anarchist insurrectionists in Mexico City denounced a rebellion that did not abolish the state and capitalism overnight. Again, in such analyses there were kernels of truth: the Oaxacan rebellion could be understood as a kind of radical populism; there were bureaucrats present in APPO from its inception. But to dismiss the entire rebellion in this way only showed where dogma can lead to: a cutting off of the branch (or pedestal) on which one stands. There is no need to endorse the Oaxacan movement uncritically and become yet another leftist cheerleader, but attitudes of disdainful superiority or maximalist denunciation are equally unhelpful. Unless, of course, one wants to miss the full significance of the rebellion entirely (3).

That said, one must recognize that even at the height of the rebellion, when the fires of Oaxaca were seen as beacons of hope around the world, certain paradoxes were noted by some commentators. Here was a movement that resonated internationally with those opposed to the status quo, and yet within Mexico itself the rebellion found no large echo, and no sequels in terms of mass actions or similar rebellions. While there was extensive coverage of Oaxaca in the Mexican media, there was no general strike in the country in support of those being crushed by the repressive power of the state in November 2006. One, two, many Oaxacas did not erupt across Mexico.

Where the situationist Raoul Vaneigem saw a Oaxaca Commune - and in this rhetoric he was merely restating a theme used by others before him - a large number of Mexicans saw something else. Rightly or wrongly, they viewed Oaxaca as being one or more of various things: a corporatist, self-interested strike by teachers; a rebellion belonging to the indigenous peoples of Oaxaca, and not the rest of Mexico; an entirely local affair that was for the Oaxacans to decide. While the influence of media distortions in such perceptions cannot be discounted, it does not explain everything. What is clear is that something in the Oaxacan movement, or in current Mexican realities, worked against its calling forth other such movements. Understanding this is perhaps the greatest analytical challenge confronting those identifying with the movement.

II

To get to a place where answers to the above questions can even be ventured, one must renounce the conceit of believing that one can “explain” Oaxaca, as if there were a single explanation (or set of explanations) that could be adduced, or as if those in the streets of Oaxaca (or elsewhere, for that matter) were waiting for some sort of benevolent act of critical interpretation that would bestow significance on what they have already made significant in their own lives.

It is also necessary to back up a bit, and to allow one to be astonished again at what did take place - and continues to take place - in Oaxaca. If such a commotion has been made about the Oaxaca rebellion, it is in the first place because of all the commotion occurring in Oaxaca itself. Beginning in June 2006, and continuing virtually without interruption for the next six months, the so-called common people of Oaxaca did uncommon things.

In an epoch in which environmental issues seem to trump all others (and there is no denying their fundamental importance), it is worth remembering that there is a human environment, and a social world, as well. What occurred in Oaxaca was an example of radical environmental change, one accomplished with a minimum of resources, and a maximum of initiative and creativity. It even extended to the kind of novel recycling plan implemented on the barricades of Oaxaca: scraps of junk, even entire automobiles, were put to new uses. The walls of the city were repainted with graffiti, featuring spray painted invectives and stenciled designs. Not all of this was at the level of poetry - far too much, in fact, remained at the level of mere sloganeering - but it did achieve the effect of reminding a world that had seen Oaxaca as only a quaint and picturesque market town that indeed something was happening in this place, that the city was a battleground whose identity was being disputed, its physiognomy refashioned.

This eruption of the marvelous in Oaxaca caught many by surprise. In the absence of serious research conducted on the scene or any comprehensive attempt to let the Oaxacan rebels tell their stories for themselves, various readymade analyses were put into service, without much concern as to whether were they were commensurate with the situation they purported to describe. It is not only the “corporate media” that engages in superficial reporting; many posting on Indymedia, while clearly motivated by something other than commercial gain, have been guilty of the same. In spite of the so-called “information age,” language and cultural barriers still exist that hinder a full translation of an event like Oaxaca into words, and for that matter, even Spanish words.

Many leftist supporters of the Oaxaca movement have produced a quick and easy solution to the riddle of its origins: it is all due to the ravages of “neo-liberalism.” Moreover, in a textbook case of a simplistic linking of “cause” and effect, the Oaxaca uprising is characterized as a response to, and revolt against, the deleterious impact of NAFTA and the Washington Consensus: the set of enforced trade agreements and financial policies that constitute the arsenal of neo-liberalism, which is only a newer name for laissez-faire and monetarist economics (of the Chicago school that wrought such havoc in Chile and Argentina, for example) (4).

Of course, just because an argument is simplistic - one thinks of the one positing the U.S.’s need for control over oil supplies as the root cause of its invasion of Iraq - doesn’t mean that it is wholly wrong. The question is whether neo-liberalism is the casus belli of the social war in Oaxaca, or even the primary target of those who have taken to its streets in protest.

Certainly, the damages wrought by neo-liberalism can be and have been measured. For the past nearly 20 years, Mexico has been caught in the vortex of a globalizing hypercapitalism and its transforming, destructive powers, of which NAFTA was only a relatively small expression (5). Before the implementation of NAFTA, the billionaire Texan populist Ross Perot warned darkly of the “giant sucking sound” that one would be able to hear as North American factory jobs migrated south of the U.S. border. He neither cared nor was clairvoyant enough to know that the post-NAFTA horror show he tried to scare American voters with would play out in a far more complicated way as far as Mexico was concerned.

Hydraulic forces would hollow out the U.S. economy without transferring substantial numbers of industrial or post-industrial jobs to Mexico, outside of those in the maquiladora (assembly for re-export, using mainly components of non-Mexican origin) zone along the U.S-Mexican border. And since it was indeed a question of a world market, and of a drive to find the lowest price for labor, Mexico was only of transient interest for transnational capital. Mexico began to lose jobs to China and elsewhere, as its export sector was undercut by products from areas where labor costs were even lower than its own. Investments in the small electronics sector in Mexico have yielded a relatively low number of jobs in high technology assembly and manufacturing, and these have been clustered around Jalisco and Mexico City, and in the maquiladora zone just described. In terms of information technology, what resulted was an “enclave economy,” and not any kind of “take off” of the Mexican economy as a whole. (For more on this subject, see Kevin P. Gallagher and Lyuba Zarsky, The Enclave Economy: Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in Mexico’s Silicon Valley, Cambridge, Mass. (2007).)

Moreover, the magnetic pull of the United States - which for decades has been unofficially importing a cheap labor force for its agricultural and service sectors from Mexico - did not disappear with NAFTA. A significant number of Oaxacan workers have continued to migrate to el Norte, and their remittances have become a major source of income in the Oaxacan economy.

This larger story is really only part of the story insofar as Oaxaca is concerned, however. If NAFTA and the changes wrought by neo-liberal policies have shaped oppositional currents throughout Mexico, including Oaxaca, and sharpened their language in terms of a denunciation of foreign capital and globalization in general (a critique of domestic Mexican capital being another matter altogether (6)), they did not alone generate the social crisis that led to the Oaxaca rebellion.

In the case of Oaxaca, this crisis predates NAFTA, and even in the current period there are other factors at work. The Plan Puebla Panama, for example, which is designed to provide infrastructure for the easier transportation of goods and resources has been targeted by Oaxacan protesters who see it as leading to a further integration of their region into an area dominated by North American capitalism. This may indeed be the end result, but the Plan Puebla Panama was largely an initiative of the Mexican state, acting in concert with other countries in the region. It may ultimately serve the interests of foreign capital, but it also has a south Mexican and Central American dimension.

And while there is of course a larger context to the Oaxaca rebellion, its immediate dimensions were shaped less by neo-liberalism in the abstract than by concrete regional characteristics of social stratification, culture, and history, including the tradition of organized protest in Oaxaca state. This also meant that while the movement had a local coloration, a uniquely Oaxacan identity, it was for this very same reason a deeply rooted, embedded phenomenon, one that could not easily be suppressed, removed, or indeed replicated elsewhere.

The rebellion was further defined by the kind of power structure it opposed, which again had specifically Oaxacan features, ones not necessarily found everywhere else in Mexico. In Oaxaca, the dinosaurs of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party, the political party that had perpetuated its rule at the national level through clientelism, repression, and the creation of a large public sector) were still in power in Oaxaca state and practicing their decades-long traditions of corruption and brutality, using caciques (political bosses) as their local surrogates. For a long time, power had been enforced in Oaxaca at the point of a gun, coupled with a kind of institutionalized bribery: the granting of subsidies to various organizations, including those perceived to be a potential threat to the social order. Under Ulises Ruiz Ortiz’s predecessor, José Murat, these subsidies were given to indigenous groups, including some organizations who loudly proclaimed their Magonista radicalism, such as the CIPO-RFM (Popular Indigenous Council of Oaxaca - Ricardo Flores Magón) (7). The withdrawal of such subsidies by Ulises Ruiz Ortiz may have been the first of the many missteps he made in confronting opposition to his rule.

Ulises Ruiz Ortiz’s decision to unleash his police against an encampment of teachers on their annual strike for better pay and improvements in the educational system was the spark that ignited a rebellion, producing a broader and bolder social movement in the streets of Oaxaca. What emerged when the clouds of tear gas cleared in June, 2006 was APPO, the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca. Its creation - in what was a classic example of a collective invention, with no individual author or instigator - was a manifestation, and the direct expression, of a struggle that had become both wider and deeper. The “assembly” part of its name was an assertion of the supposed sovereignty of its rank and file, which meant that the movement would, in theory, no longer be beholden to the teachers’ union and its bureaucracy.

III

When looked at retrospectively, the trajectory of the Oaxaca rebellion resembles that of one of the fireworks that were used as improvised weapons by the movement. There was a smoldering at the beginning, a swift ascent, and then an explosion that left pieces and burning embers scattered on the ground. In trying to discern just where the brightest sparks were, some recapitulation of the key episodes in the movement is necessary. Furthermore, an interpretation of the movement’s rise and fall requires a closer scrutiny of its various components.

APPO was a problematic entity from its inception. It quickly became clear that, in its emphasis on a kind of lowest-common-denominator unity, APPO had become all things to all people, being part bureaucratic condominium and part social movement. For the anti-authoritarian component of the rebellion, it was an example of direct democracy. For the Stalinists of the FPR (Revolutionary Popular Front, an organization controlled by the Communist Party of Mexico (Marxist-Leninist)), whose operatives moved aggressively to install themselves in positions of leadership, empowering themselves as spokespersons for APPO, it represented a golden opportunity to expand their influence. Other political groupings, such as NIOAX (The New Left of Oaxaca in which the político Flavio Sosa - and the first political prisoner of the Oaxacan movement - had found his latest perch), saw an opening for a more conventional kind of political advancement. In the words of those who later criticized such manipulation and opportunism, APPO was viewed by some as a “trampoline”: its power could be leveraged to achieve other aims, whether securing elective office or furthering the agenda of a Marxist-Leninist party, or both at the same time. The much vaunted “autonomy” of the base of APPO was often more honored in the breach than in reality, at least within the assembly itself.

As mentioned previously, the Oaxaca rebellion did not appear ex nihilo or simply as a spontaneous response to economic and political circumstances. There had been a longstanding history of opposition to the status quo in the state of Oaxaca, one in which the tactic of the plantón (protest encampment) had been used repeatedly; indeed, it was part of the repertoire of social protest in Mexico generally. Over two decades, Section 22 of the teachers union had demonstrated its combativeness and its demands often exceeded purely economic categories: better education for indigenous peoples has been foremost among them. However, there had also been a clear limit to the kind of struggle waged by the teachers. While often portrayed as altruistic champions of the indigenous peoples of Oaxaca - and behind this idealized portrait there is indeed some truth - the teachers’ struggle clearly also had an element of self-interest.

For example, it was no accident that the leadership of the teachers’ union, immediately prior to intervention of the Federal Police in October 2006, was prepared to cut a deal and sell out the rest of APPO. This betrayal was denounced by the rest of the Oaxacan movement, including the rank and file of the teachers union itself, but the picture was not as simple as a clear division between union bureaucrats on the one side and radical base on the other. Within the teachers union, and in opposition to its more mainstream leadership, the Stalinists of the FPR had a considerable following, and this was the organizational fulcrum that allowed them to effectively colonize much of APPO itself, installing their activists in key positions and attempting to curtail and silence the anti-authoritarian currents within the larger rebellion. It is perhaps no surprise that radical Oaxacan teachers, who like their counterparts in so many other countries see themselves as bearers of consciousness to the unenlightened masses, would also be such avid Marxist-Leninists.

Before this dreary denouement, however, a good deal else happened in Oaxaca that was due to the initiatives of the movement’s base and which largely escaped the strict control of its proto-bureaucratic “representatives.” These outlined a new configuration of social power in Oaxaca, but not in the classic sense of “dual power” so often discussed by revolutionary theorists in the twentieth century. In Oaxaca, this reconfiguration was more implicit than explicit, more “nomadic” and mobile than something objectified. This relative failure of the movement is something its critics on the left point to, but they overlook the fact that it was “in its own existence in acts” that the Paris Commune had value in the eyes of Marx.

What still isn’t clear at this late date is what happened inside APPO, and what its proceedings were like. We know that there countless meetings, and that various commissions were elected with specific tasks to accomplish. In this respect, there does seem to have been a principle of mandates that operated within APPO. But the fact that various spokespersons (and it worth reiterating that these were for the most part Stalinists) continued to speak for the movement, without any accountability to its base, throws this into question. The fact that the assembly insisted on functioning on the basis of consensus, at least in its first few months, is also interesting, but no less problematic. Strict adherence to consensus would seem ipso facto to mitigate against the ability of a radical minority to have its viewpoints expressed in the assembly. Anti-authoritarians within the movement would later discover the limits of such a principle, and of an illusory consensus that in any case was not something that bothered the unscrupulous operators of the FPR. At present, we have no transcripts available to see if the deliberations of the rank and file of APPO meeting in assembly were, in fact, analogous to the debates of the Petrograd Soviet or to revolutionary workers’ assemblies in Barcelona in 1936-1937. For all of the use of the term “Oaxaca Commune,” at this point it can only be understood at best as a goal the movement aspired to, and at worst as mere wishful thinking.

What is clear, however, is that the period of October-November 2006 was the highwater of the Oaxaca rebellion, and the decisive stage for the movement in a strategic sense. With the entry of the Federal police into the city on October 29, 2006, the movement was confronted by the armed power of the Mexican state, and not just the police and goons ( porros) of the governor. Following this intervention, the rebellion was first placed on the defensive, being dislodged from its central positions in and around the zócalo (town square or plaza) and falling back, under the pressure of riot police and tear gas fired from helicopters and on the ground, toward the area around the university.

On November 2, 2006, as the police moved toward the university to silence the movement’s remaining radio station (one that had served as a vital means of coordinating resistance to the police), a defense was mounted by the rebellion, using the barricades that had already been erected in the city. Determined street fighters were successful in thwarting the police advance into the university, and for a time it looked as though the movement had regained the initiative. But after this victory in the streets, protesters sought to retake the zócalo on November 25, 2006, and in doing so they fell into trap designed expertly by the authorities, who launched their own violent counter-offensive against the movement. The results of this would be counted in the scores of wounded protesters, the killings conducted by porros, the imprisonment of activists, and a general strategic situation in which the movement was forced underground and literally put on the run.

When the rebellion raised its head again in Oaxaca City in early 2007, it was not the same movement. The movement confronted a kind of police state at the local level, while its own contradictions had sharpened, reaching the breaking point. Already, on November 25, 2006, at a crucial moment of confrontation with the police, the self-styled leadership of APPO had tried to remove the Cinco Señores barricade, only to be shouted down by its defenders, who refused to move. A more general split between the Stalinist, official face of APPO and the anti-authoritarian currents within its base was intensifying, and would emerge in broad daylight in early 2007.

IV

In the beginning of September 2006, at a time when barricades surged throughout the city of Oaxaca, it was evident that an unprecedented occurrence was taking place: the city had been converted into a laboratory. Never in the contemporary history of the country and its cities had barricades been erected on such a large scale (and neither had there been spontaneous creations of such amplitude in an urban setting in Mexico), something that also implies that never before had the population of a city taken control of such an extensive urban area.
-- Hector Ballesteros, Introduction to Puntos B: Cartografias de una ciudad en crisis: Oaxaca 2006, interactive DVD, 2007 (http://puntosb.blogspot.com)

As well as a narrative of politics at the macro and micro levels, the Oaxaca rebellion should be understood in terms of the creation of an alternative social space within the city of Oaxaca itself. This space was created by means of occupations, the erecting of barricades, and in the large street protests (called “megamarches,” often, but not always, accurately) conducted by the movement over a period of many months. As much as any meeting of APPO, this is where the movement expressed itself and, like so many other similar movements, free and creative expression was one of its central characteristics. The rebellion itself was a kind of streaming torrent of words, images, and deeds. These left their imprint on the walls of the city, on the intersections of its streets, and in the minds of its inhabitants. When the police reoccupied the center of Oaxaca, one of the first acts of the authorities was to order a painting over of all graffiti, an act that resulted in swathes of different colored paint replacing the slogans and stencils of the movement. This abstract police “art” was designed to erase all traces of the rebellion, but all it did was to provide those with cans of spray paint a fresh canvas for their works.

As Hector Ballesteros implies in his remark about Oaxaca becoming a “laboratory,” the rebellion had an experimental quality in the uses it made of the city. Whatever its shortcomings in terms of political clarity or an ability to generalize its struggle, the rebels of Oaxaca showed a remarkable endurance, as a well as a considerable talent for improvisation and innovation.

One of the myths that has grown up around the movement, and needs dispelling even at the risk of upsetting many of its supporters, is that the rebellion was completely or even essentially non-violent. While the movement seems to have made a collective decision not to escalate its own violence, and to act in self-defense of the spaces it occupied, it was not a peaceful struggle in the pacifist sense. Instead, it was a hybrid: something more than a movement conducting civil disobedience, and something less than urban guerrilla warfare, it had aspects of both.

The term “asymmetrical warfare” is a buzzword among military theorists, a euphemism for a battle in which the sides are unequal, or wage qualitatively different kinds of combat. For such analysts, the Oaxaca movement may ultimately serve as a textbook case. An interesting example of the rebellion’s creativity is how participants gave a new and positive meaning to the phrase “smoke and mirrors.” At crucial points in the battles with police, groups of bazuqueros (named for the plastic tubes they used as launchers for fireworks) would shoot sky rockets at the police lines, thereby partially offsetting the effect of volleys of teargas directed at the protesters. Buses were also set on fire and rolled toward police lines: these were called kamikazes. (If nothing else, the Oaxaca rebellion has added some new words to the lexicon of radical social protest.)

Mirrors were used both to reflect light and to put matters in a different light. When a police helicopter circled over a crowd of protesters on November 1, 2006, hundreds of hand mirrors were used by those on the ground in an attempt to confuse or disorient the pilot. If nothing else, it showed the Mexican armed forces that they were dealing with a movement that was not easily intimidated. After reports of rapes and other violence by police against women who had been arrested, protesters held up larger mirrors to the federal police, who could their faces in the mirrors with the superimposed words: “I am a rapist.”

One of the most interesting aspects of the Oaxaca rebellion, and one that may in fact define it for posterity, has been the degree to which women have participated in it, creating their own space within the movement and undertaking important initiatives of their own. In this, they have directly challenged the reigning machismo of Mexican society in general and the patriarchal traditions of indigenous culture in Oaxaca state specifically. The radical redefinition of gender roles is a topic much discussed in the well appointed campuses of North American and European academia. In Oaxaca, such change has had a more down-to-earth and substantive meaning: relations between men and women, and among diverse categories of people generally, are being renegotiated in everyday life and in the context of a radical social movement.

Women took the lead in one of the most remarkable episodes in the rebellion: the taking over of a local television station, which then resumed broadcasting as a movement station, with the occupiers creating new programs, conducting interviews, and radically altering the balance of media power within the city. Not of all of these broadcasts were free of dogma or repetition, but in at least some of them a rebellious, alternative spirit shone through.

Young people also played a major role in all phases of the rebellion, contributing both élan in the street fighting and taking the initiative in creating alternative media that played a vital role as sources of tactical intelligence (about police movements, for example) and as a means of communicating the ideas of the movement to the surrounding population. These media included the radio stations used by the movement, as well as publications like Barrikada and various cultural workshops that brought fresh perspectives and new idioms to social protest in Oaxaca. And this was all done without younger activists ever narrowly defining themselves as protagonists of a “revolt of youth.”

However, there was a far from progressive aspect to the rebellion’s relation to its very youngest participants, and this was the curious (and perhaps culturally specific) use of children as mascots who mimicked adults in giving staged performances of speeches before much older audiences, mouthing words that they clearly could not have written, much less fully understood. This was repeated in similarly scripted appearances by children in programs broadcast by the occupied television station and by the movement’s radio stations. What may have looked cute to a Oaxacan audience only seems to an outsider to be both contrived and cloying, however benign its intention may have been. Documentaries made by U.S. and Mexican independent media have recorded such scenes without any comment, displaying a kind of paternalistic indulgence that ironically, and no doubt unintentionally, echoes past stereotypes of indigenous peoples as “nature’s children.”

In terms of the socio-economic categories represented in the movement, great attention has been paid of course to the role of teachers, at least initially, and that played by the working population generally in Oaxaca, along with the inhabitants of poor neighborhoods. Marxists have seen the heterogeneity of the movement as its Achilles’ heel: it was not strictu sensu a "truly working class" phenomenon. This may indeed be a reason why the movement did not receive tangible support elsewhere in Mexico, unlike recent strikes there that have received an active response from other workers. But the issue of class, in a era in which so many fixed social categories, including class structure, are being disarticulated or recomposed, is one that is in need of a radical rethinking to begin with, especially as the much-touted “modern proletariat” dear to situationists and others has yet to make its appointed rendezvous with history. There is no doubt, however, that a sociological inventory of the Oaxacan movement would reveal specific characteristics that may not be found elsewhere, either in Mexico or in other countries.

*

Where does the sound come from?
It is the sound of the barricade…
-- “The Sound of the Barricade,” a song of the Oaxaca rebellion

One category of participants that is discussed by Mexican observers, but by few outsiders, is that of the chavos banda, a term that is difficult to render into English, but which means something like “street toughs” or “hoodlums” (a French equivalent might be blousons noirs). This group played an active role in the rebellion, especially on the barricades and in the fighting with police, and became so conspicuous as to figure in the polemics of others. Not surprisingly, since these were members of the “lumpen-proletariat” (and one must remember just how pejorative and subjective a term this is, and that it is another of Marx’s more dubious theoretical legacies), they were viewed with scorn by the Stalinists of the FPR and by those with a more secure social status generally, such as the teachers and the petty bourgeois elements who were also part of the movement. And it is not an unambiguous story, for that matter. Many of these politicized street fighters were influenced by anarchist ideas (another reason why they were treated with such disdain by Marxist-Leninists), but that didn’t mean that their autonomous actions always made strategic sense to the organized anarchists in Oaxaca. Clearly, however, it would be interesting to know more about how such tensions have played out since the end of November 2006, and to learn what has happened to the chavos banda since the ebbing of the rebellion as a movement in the streets.

In addition to those on the barricades, the other radical focii of the Oaxaca rebellion were comprised of those groups and individuals within APPO who challenged the hegemony of the FPR Stalinists over the formal structures of the assembly. These anti-authoritarians, who loosely comprised the Magonista/anti-bureaucratic wing of the movement, did have a conscious political perspective, one that was committed to free debate and the autonomous power of the rank and file of APPO. Having been outmaneuvered by the FPR in the early phase of the assembly, these elements - who included the groups that make up the Alianza Magonista Zapatista and the more recently-formed VOCAL (Voces Oaxaqueñas Construyendo Autonomía y Libertad, or Oaxacan Voices Constructing Autonomy and Freedom) - were in a weak position to challenge the Stalinists, especially when the base of APPO could no longer meet easily or openly in the wake of the severe repression in the weeks and months after November 2006. However, these groups did publicize their vehement criticisms of the FPR’s manipulative politics and its character assassinations of those opposed to its vise-like hold on APPO (for English translations of materials detailing the positions of the anti-authoritarian left in Oaxaca, see www.collectivereinventions.org).

Shortly after these divisions within APPO came out into the open, the leading activist of VOCAL, David Venegas, was imprisoned by the state, giving the anti-authoritarians in Oaxaca a figure and a cause (political prisoners) around which they could rally, as they also tried at the same time to disseminate their anti-Stalinist views on the future of the movement. However, the imprisonment of Venegas deprived them of an eloquent and sharp tongue, one that was unafraid of taking the fight to the FPR (Venegas was released from prison - for the time being - in early March 2008, but still faces trial on a number of charges). In late 2007, the anti-bureaucratic wing of APPO held a public meeting, which called itself the Third State Assembly of APPO, one that was convened in an open break with the FPR or “official” wing of APPO. This brought together a number of groups, as well as representatives from neighborhoods and the (former) barricades, including a considerable number of young anti-authoritarians.

While this development seemed to indicate that there was a clear opening for the anti-Stalinist sector to grow and establish itself on its own terms as an autonomous movement (with or without the use of the APPO name, which some in VOCAL saw as already badly compromised by the actions of the FPR), but it appears that, for the time being at least, the Oaxacan anti-authoritarians are waging a valiant but lonely battle, making do with limited resources and attracting only a relatively small number of people to their cause.

State repression and the bureaucratic politics of the FPR and its teachers’ affiliate have taken their toll in Oaxaca. The movement is no longer what it was, and no longer mobilizes the crowds it did in its heyday. Thrown on the defensive, what remains of the rebellion has been reduced to almost a single demand - the one, overriding issue that has been there from the beginning - the removal of the reviled Ulises Ruiz Ortiz from office. In doing so, the movement has become self-limiting: it no longer overtly embodies a vision of a different society, something that is admittedly very hard to do in present circumstances. Still, meetings take place, and young anarchists have been especially active in keeping the flames of the rebellion from being entirely extinguished. Meanwhile, the teachers’ union has gone its own way again, and while making an appeal for the release of political prisoners, has essentially returned to the terrain of corporatist, economic demands.

The last pages of the Oaxaca revolt clearly have not been written yet. However, if the rebellion is ever to become a mass phenomenon again, and if its message is to be taken up elsewhere in Mexico, it will have to, somewhat paradoxically, reconnect with the larger Oaxacan society while trying to break out of being narrowly typecast as a purely Oaxacan movement. It is a very tall order, and it seems arrogant for those on the outside to criticize the shortcomings of a rebellion that went as far as the one in Oaxaca did. But turning a blind eye to the movement’s weaknesses and dilemmas is of no use to anyone.

Part 2:

V

"…it can be calculated that, with little effort, more than 10,000 men would be ready to come to this parish from the surrounding mountains, bold like the climate of the land, as is witnessed by the atrocious happenings that have taken place, more in this one province than in all the others of the realm; and so wary are these men that I have heard and know things about them in this business that cannot be said of very experienced captains."
-- Fr. Alonso de Cuevas Dávalos, Bishop of Oaxaca, in his letter to the viceroy from Tehuantepec, April 1660 (8)

In trying to trace the contours of the larger context in which the Oaxaca rebellion emerged, one is reminded of explorers seeking the origins of the Nile: it all depends on how far back one wants to go. As the above citation indicates, the Oaxaca region was considered a rebellious land a full century after the Spanish conquest of Mexico, and it was the scene of several major revolts against colonial authority. In describing the same revolt of 1660 that so alarmed the good Bishop of Oaxaca, another of his compatriots referred gravely to “circumstances of rebellion and bad spirit” that prevailed in the region.

Supporters of the current rebellion have been tempted to draw a direct line from incidents like the 1660 Tehuantepec revolt, which occurred in the south of what is now Oaxaca state, to the events of today, viewing the contemporary movement as being only the latest episode in an unbroken tradition of aboriginal opposition to Western society in all its guises, whether in the form of Spanish conquistadors, the Mexican state, U.S. imperialism, or globalized consumer culture. This theme has frequently appeared in the discourse of indigenous radicalism itself, where the connection between past and present has been made literal in the celebration of “500 years of resistance” on the part of native peoples to “foreign” (i.e., non-indigenous) domination.

If one sympathizes with the thrust of this argument, there are nonetheless problems with any idealization of native traditions, and with the construction of an imperfectly understood communality set against the supposedly absolute evils of Modernity. In stating this, one does not impugn, or describe as “false consciousness,” the viewpoints of the indigenous themselves about their lives, their struggles, and their fundamental grievances against the ruling order, both local and global. On the contrary, it accords these viewpoints the autonomy they deserve (who else but the indigenous can speak for, rather than just on behalf of, native cultures?), and it recognizes a certain incapacity on the part of the outside observer to grasp the realities of indigenous societies, to see the world in the same way as those looking at it through autochthonous eyes.

However, recognizing such a limit to understanding does not require a wholesale abandonment of critical faculties in favor of the empty generalities that characterize so much of the language of First World supporters of Fourth World radicalism, rhetoric that is more emotive than analytical, and more acclamation than a substantive encounter with indigenous realities. To read some accounts, one would think that there had existed some pre-Columbian Golden Age in which peace, equality, and cooperation reigned throughout the lands that would come to be known (in homage to their European colonizers) as the Americas. Put simply, this legend doesn't allow facts to get in the way of its utopian story line. It ignores or trivializes the existence of hereditary (and absolutist) authority, castes, slavery, and tribal warfare in the indigenous world prior to the Conquest.

To return to reality and to the situation in Oaxaca, a key challenge for outsiders (and the status of being an extranjero is not one that is necessarily possible to overcome, but may be one that, when allowances are made, affords a perspective that is of value precisely because of its focal length from the subject) is precisely that of grappling with the relationship of the rebellion to indigenous culture. Participants have stressed that there has been a strong imprint left on the movement by the example of traditional “practices and customs” ( usos y costumbres, which can also be translated as “customary law” or "traditional practices") observed in many villages in Oaxaca state. This influence is underlined, to begin with, by the central importance attached by the movement to the idea and practice of an assembly, with the assembly form being construed by participants as integral to the rebellion’s experiment in direct democracy in 2006.

The elements of usos y costumbres that are most often described by observers and by indigenous peoples themselves are, in addition to the importance of the village assembly as the sovereign body of consensual decision-making: 1) the system of cargos or offices that a village citizen is expected to serve in; 2) a form of obligatory and unpaid labor on behalf of the community known as tequio; 3) a practice of reciprocal exchange of gifts and services known (in Zapotec) as guelaguetza; 4) a deep commitment to the value of cooperation; and 5) the continuing communal ownership of lands.

It is worth noting that nearly all of these “practices and customs” are ones that have changed over time, and have undergone fundamental transformations, as has, of course, the very structure of indigenous society in Mexico, beginning with the disappearance of its hereditary nobility. Moreover, if today’s usos y costumbres are not whole and intact practices from another age that have been preserved in some kind of cultural amber, they are also not uniform, varying considerably within Oaxaca state.

As an example of how history has modified what are presented as “timeless” traditions, one can take the example of one of them: tequio, generally described as unpaid, but obligatory, labor on behalf of the community. Along with the importance of cooperation in indigenous villages, this practice is often adduced as a living example of mutual aid in a communal society, which in many cases in Oaxaca it undoubtedly is. However, it is interesting to trace the etymology of the word itself and to see the different meanings it has acquired in various contexts. Tequio is derived from the Nahuatl (Aztec) word tequitl, and originally meant “tribute,” as in labor and lands due to the traditional nobility (the pre-Columbian, indigenous ruling caste) or other overlords (including the Aztec conquerors of other indigenous tribes). It was later integrated and codified as the tribute system of the Spanish colonizers, who deftly made use of tribal and caste divisions within indigenous society, fissures that had already played a major role in facilitating the Conquest itself.

While tequio, as it is practiced in contemporary Oaxaca, may conjure up in some North American or European minds a vision of voluntary collaboration - as in the community gardens of Berkeley’s People’s Park in 1969 or in still earlier cooperative endeavors in Provo Amsterdam - its positive connotations are again something that developed and were modified over time, and not everywhere. In parts of Central America, the negative meaning has not been lost: in Nicaraguan Spanish, tequioso means “overbearing,” “cumbersome,” or “bothersome,” clearly showing its root in a word associated with coerced labor, obligation, and duty.

The system of cargos is also problematic, and hardly merits the enthusiasm of anti-authoritarians who are proponents of assemblies and revocable delegates. In approximately 15% of traditional Oaxacan villages, women are formally barred from participating in the village assembly, and from holding office (a cargo). This fact has recently received a good deal of attention in the Mexican media as the result of the case of Eufrosina Cruz Mendoza, who could not stand for president in her native village of Santa María Quiegolani (in Oaxaca state) for the simple reason that she is female. Such an example of a kind of gender-based apartheid should give serious pause to anyone trying to see Oaxacan villages as being contemporary analogues to the rural collectives of the Spanish Revolution. It also underlines the degree to which the contemporary Oaxacan movement broke new ground vis-à-vis traditional indigenous culture, especially (but not only) in regards to gender roles. In many ways, then, the Oaxaca rebellion was not an atavistic or “traditional” phenomenon. The assembly in the urban Oaxaca rebellion - to the extent that it functioned as a gathering of the rank-and-file participants electing mandated, revocable delegates - was something different than an assembly of all the citizens of a indigenous village. It may have had a link to communal practices in Oaxaca state, but it was also an innovation compared to those same traditions, with more in common with autonomous forms produced in other struggles in Latin America in recent decades, ranging from Chile 1973 (the cordones industriales) to the recent piquetero movement in Argentina.

The relevance of indigenous customs and practices is open to question in other respects as well. In many traditional Oaxacan villages, one is obliged to perform “socially useful labor” and to accept responsibility in a number of defined positions (the aforementioned cargos). If one refuses or evades such obligations, one is deprived of citizenship in the village, in effect becoming ostracized from the life of the community. Oaxacans who leave their village and become immigrant workers in the U.S. and Canada still must fulfill such obligations in order to retain their status as village citizens. It is testimony to the importance of such an identity that many such immigrants return to their villages to acquit their responsibilities; it is revealing of the ambiguities of such an identity that its communality implies a certain coercion and that today the notion of what is voluntary or freely given is undermined by the fact that village members can pay others to perform their tequio obligations: the rural commune meets the cash nexus, and not only at this point. Remittances from Oaxacans working in the U.S. and Canada serve to buoy the state economy, but they have also transformed aspects of village life in rural Oaxaca, bringing satellite dishes and other appurtenances of the consumer society so disdained by First World supporters of indigenous cultures.

Furthermore, in the present array of social power in Oaxaca, the system of usos y costumbres - practices that have a legal, codified status in the state - can be understood as a form of recuperation, as a way of integrating traditional indigenous society into pre-existing structures of political and social power. The official enshrinement of usos y costumbres took place in 1995 during the tenure of the PRI governor José Murat, at precisely a time when the ruling elite in Oaxaca felt under attack by demands for autonomy from indigenous movements in the state. A careful study by Alejandro Anaya Munoz reveals the elite’s strategy, in the face of this threat, to have been one of cooptation and the integration of indigenous demands, combined with the traditional resort of buying off local caciques and making pay offs to villagers at election time (9).

What then, in the end, can be said about the relationship of traditional practices to the social movement in Oaxaca? Clearly, there is one, but as explained above, it is not unequivocal. This does not mean that it is trivial, either, or that the indigenous perspective is somehow only a secondary question. However, a definitive theoretical position vis-à-vis these issues may be a chimera. Rather than trying to arrive at an answer that in any case could never be definitive, but only approximate, one may have to pose questions instead, and to insist on the wrinkles in a landscape that others see as flat or uncomplicated.

For unconditional - and uncritical - supporters of indigenous struggles there are no such conceptual problems. They simply endorse traditional practices as being innately egalitarian and communal; some even go so far as to make extravagant claims about the cosmovisíon (view of the world) of native peoples, raising the dissimilarity between traditional and modern mentalities to the level of pure ontological difference (10). This a classic example of an essentialist argument: there is a true “Indian-ness” that is ahistorical, immutable and organic. And what emerges from such thinking is a kind of identity politics based on an indigenist fundamentalism.

Conversely, traditional Marxists tend to be preemptively dismissive of any argument on behalf of radical peasantries and their communal traditions. In this, one hears the voice of the Master: the Marx who famously referred in the opening section of The Communist Manifesto to “the idiocy of rural life.” There is, of course, more to the Marxist argument than mere condescension, including a younger Marx’s own rhapsodizing in The German Ideology about a communist society in which he could hunt, fish, and philosophize all on the same day, without having to be defined by any one activity (11). However, for almost all Marxists, who base their perspective on a theory of necessary, inevitable stages of history, there is only one possible passage to a post-capitalist future, and that gate is opened by the industrial working class. All other agency on the part of subordinated social elements is discounted; at best, it can be an adjunct to the actions of the working class, who must play a vanguard role (except, although this is never admitted by Marxist theorists, when they must follow the lead of the real vanguard: the radical intelligentsia to which the theorists belong).

In recent years, however, Marxist teleologies have been thrown for a loop more than once, and dissident Marxists have recognized this. Autonomist Marxism has shown itself to be much more open to a consideration of non-traditional social movements (in Argentinia, Bolivia, and Mexico) as being charged with radical, anti-capitalist potentialities. Unfortunately, their writings on the subject often veer into post-modernist self-parody, as when the terms “valorization” (as a positive term relating to radical protagonists and their autonomous actions) and “biopolitics” appear.

In contrast, the anarchist tradition historically has been far more open to the consideration of radical initiatives by peasants, and has gone much further than Marxism in including a critique of the domination of nature (a project that is at the heart of productivist Leninist states) as part of its rejection of social hierarchies, the state, and capital. It precisely for this reason, along with an insistence on the importance of cooperation and community, that the works of Kropotkin, Réclus, and Landauer have acquired a new relevance, even for some Marxists. And in the case of Latin American anarchist thinkers, and the kinds of issues present in Oaxaca, there is a much more direct connection. Peruvian anarchists in the very early years of the twentieth century not only were trying to integrate indigenous perspectives into their theory of how an Andean libertarian communism could be achieved, they included Andeans among their ranks. There is a certain, sweet irony in the fact that the histories and movements that seemed so antiquated or obsolete to 20th century Latin American Marxists (with a few exceptions, José Carlos Mariátegui among them) are now receiving the attention they deserve. Historians of Latin American anarchism continue to uncover a past that has implications in the present, and they have not yet begun to exhaust the subject (12).

As for Oaxaca, one need look no farther than its most famous anarchist native son: Ricardo Flores Magón, whose influence on the current social movement there is such that there is an entire sector whose orientation is Magonista (and this has been described in a previous section). Although, and this was also mentioned earlier, there is a possibility for any radical tendency to be neutralized or bought off by the state (and there does seem to have been a kind of recuperated Magonism among the various political currents in Oaxaca), at the core of Magón’s own thinking is an uncompromising insistence on revolutionary transformation and the linking of ends and means in the struggle to bring about a free society. His anarchism included more than a mere sensitivity to indigenous issues: in a very real sense, these concerns were at the core of his radical vision.

Magón famously declared in 1911 that “the Mexican people are suited for communism,” by which he emphatically meant libertarian communism, an egalitarian society beyond the state and capital, and beyond the tyranny of party bosses of whatever stripe. And this was no mere assertion of his own credo: he based his affirmation on observations made in Oaxaca and elsewhere in Mexico, where he knew that a tradition of communal ownership and cooperation had survived into the twentieth century:

"The Mexican people hate, by instinct, authority and the bourgeoisie. Everyone who has lived in Mexico can assure us that there is no one more cordially hated than the policeman, that the soldier, admired and applauded in all other places, is seen with antipathy and contempt, and that anyone who doesn’t make his living with his hands is hated.

This in itself is enough for a social revolution which is economic in nature and anti-authoritarian, but there is more. Four million Indians live in Mexico who, until twenty or twenty-five years ago lived in communities possessing the lands, the waters, and the forests in common. Mutual aid was the rule in these communities, in which authority was felt only when the tax collector appeared periodically or when “recruiters” showed up in search of men to force into the army. In these communities there were no judges, mayors, jailers, in fact no bothersome people at all of this type."

( Regeneracíon, September 12, 1901. Translation by Chas Bufe, Dreams of Freedom: A Ricardo Flores Magón Reader, AK Press (2005) )

The common lands question is one that has intrigued a number of radical analysts of the situation in Oaxaca. While one might want to believe that in Oaxaca and Chiapas some sort of equivalent of the Russian mir survives as a opening through which society could make a radical leap - on the basis of collective property and communal, cooperative practices - into libertarian communism, in the absence of greater proof this only utopian speculation. As it is now, the “rural communes” of Oaxaca are often locked in disputes with each other over their collectively owned lands, and the demand for indigenous “autonomy” often seems more a call for a kind of radical autarky than any general, revolutionary transformation of society.

For modernizing capitalism or productivist Marxism, social differences are to be steamrolled in the name of homogenization, a process in which there is no place for traditional practices, except in their instrumentalization as folklore or cultural window dressing. But if traditional societies can be characterized precisely by the qualities that differentiate them from dominant society, there is another kind of difference that cannot rise up in a consensual, collective society at the village level. What is not there is a certain complexity and variation, as well as an aleatory quality that is usually associated with a more urban life. There is little possibility of a subculture, and ultimately, of politics in such communities. It is no accident that the initial site of the Oaxaca rebellion was in Oaxaca City and not the countryside, a fact that also largely accounts for its assuming a different complexion than the Zapatista movement in Chiapas.

Moreover, there is a danger in imbuing traditional society or some radical peasantry with a redemptive, salvationist mission that replicates that formerly assigned to the industrial proletariat. Today’s anti-authoritarians run the risk of furthering a kind of contemporary Third Worldism in their uncritical support of the Zapatistas and the Oaxacan movement, and even more nuanced interpretations sometimes reek of vicarious pleasure, the enjoyment of radical violence at a distance, one that is both geographic and social. There must be some more meaningful and creative way to engage the Oaxaca rebellion than that which basically corresponds to watching the street fighting of others (and lamenting the fact that circumstances don’t allow one to engage in the same sort of activity oneself).

However laudable the concept, mere emulation is another non-starter. In the first place, especially for those in advanced capitalist societies, all the world is not like this place called Oaxaca, much as one might like to think so. To be sure, there are cops and corrupt, arbitrary authorities everywhere, and to that extent one could say, if one wanted to engage in empty posturing, that “We All Live In Oaxaca.” But the specific mix that generated the Oaxaca rebellion, the particular socio-economic structure and history of the city and region, is not reproduced in the “metropoles” of the North, or even in those of the South, for that matter.

However, it would be a mistake to understand the Oaxaca rebellion as only a local, and localized, phenomenon. Oaxaca is literally part of the world, and especially in the context of a globalized economy, whether it wants to be or not. Oaxacan workers have emigrated to the US and Canada, and have brought their politics with them. The circulation of people who move within Mexico (and outside it) is impelled by forces that affect those in other countries and regions, and to that extent, others have a stake in the outcome of rebellions such as that in Oaxaca. This stake goes beyond the abstractions of political economy or even the concrete encounters with some aspect of Oaxaca that might occur in everyday life (if you live in California, for example, the person cleaning your dishes in a restaurant or picking the fruit and vegetables that end up on your table might very well be Oaxacan).

VI

“Geography is not an immutable thing. It is made, it is remade every day; at each instant, it is modified by men’s actions.”
-- Elisée Reclus, L’Homme et la terre (1905-1908)

For those outside of Mexico, especially in the United States and Canada, a study of the various processes that link these countries to Mexico, and to Oaxaca specifically, is perhaps more timely than an illusory attempt to “fully” understand the question of usos y costumbres. The phenomenon of large numbers of Oaxacans seeking work in the North is generally well known, but there are more aspects to this than the simple question of remittances or even of the status of illegal immigrants in a hostile (i.e., increasingly nativist and racist) socio-political environment.

Oaxacan workers have brought their culture and their politics with them in their travels to the North. They have created their own labor organizations, with their own publications, and have often brought to these activities a specifically indigenous perspective, which cannot therefore simply be assimilated as “Hispanic” or “Mexican-American.” It would seem incumbent upon supporters of the Oaxacan rebellion to learn more about the Oaxacans in California, Oregon, or British Columbia, for example, and about their struggles, which have included demonstrations in Los Angeles in 2006 against police repression back home in Oaxaca (13).

There are also ways to make connections to Oaxaca, and to make a conscious choice to aid the most radical wing of the movement there. There is material support that can be given to organizations; there are protests that can be (and have been) organized at Mexican consulates in support of political prisoners, and in the United States generally against anti-immigrant hysteria. There are also, and not secondarily, words: ones that go beyond mere received opinion, even of the “alternative” kind. The best tribute to the rebellion is to partake of its spirit in taking risks, and by sticking one’s neck out, even on the written page.

In a contemporary era characterized in many parts of the globe by war, misery, and environmental destruction - and made all the more dreary by mass indifference, resignation, or distraction in the face of this, especially in the misnamed “advanced” societies - events like the Oaxaca rebellion are as inspirational as they are rare. One can be fairly certain that, at least in Latin America, other radical social movements will emerge, and that they too will have their anti-authoritarian, emancipatory currents. But unless these consolidate themselves and become conscious of their aims and their enemies (who include, in addition to the generals and thugs of the right, the bureaucrats and caudillos of the left), they are doomed to remaining interesting footnotes to history, rather than doors that open on to a brighter future.

March 2008

Collective Inventions would like to thank Claudio Albertani for his comments on an early draft of this essay, and also Loren Goldner for sending materials collected in Oaxaca. Of course, they are in no way liable for the opinions expressed here.

Those nearer to home who have helped immensely with this project know who they are, and how much their assistance has been appreciated.

We hope to publish a more complete printed version of this pamphlet in the near future. Translations of selected texts from and about the Oaxaca rebellion can be found at: www.collectivereinventions.org

Notes:

1 For all of the Zapatistas’ disavowal of their being a vanguard in the tradition of Latin American Marxism-Leninism - a disavowal that led to the EZLN becoming the favorite army of the world anarchist and altermondialiste movements - it is still not clear how far Marcos has moved from the Maoist background of his youth. For all of the editions (in countless translations) of every utterance of the Subcommander, no one among the legions of Zapatists seems to have asked themselves a few obvious questions: Why is it that it is almost always Marcos - the intellectual who is both the ideologue and strategist of the EZLN - who speaks in the name of the Indians of the Lacandon jungle? How does the aura of celebrity surrounding Marcos differ from other cults of personality? And just where does internationalism begin, and Mexican nationalism end, in the Zapatista program? After all, the EZLN doesn’t call itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation for nothing.

2 The Oaxacan experience has attracted participant-witnesses who have produced interesting and detailed accounts of events. It also been a magnet for the kind of “revolutionary tourist” denounced long ago by Hans Magnus Enzenberger (“Tourists of the Revolution,” Dreamers of the Absolute, London: 1988) and whose breathless dispatches from the frontlines have not necessarily been accurate or informative. In the former category, one must mention George Lapierre, whose chronicles of the first six months of the rebellion are rich in detail and insight, and are frankly vastly superior to the earnest, but highly simplistic articles that comprise Nancy Davies’s The People Decide: Oaxaca’s Popular Assembly, New York: 2007. Unfortunately, Lapierre’s accounts - written orignally in French - have not yet been translated. Many of his accounts can be found compiled in the special issue of the French journal CQFD, “La Libre Commune d’Oaxaca,” January-February 2007 (www.cequilfautdetruire.org).

3 For the ICC’s verdict on Oaxaca, see http://www.internationalism.org/ . For the anarchist insurrectionist critique of APPO, which in its itemization of the various political maneuverings within APPO was both prescient and precise, see the text by the Coordinadora Insurreccional Anarquista (http://espora.org/okupache//b21hart_imp.php?p=1249&more=1). A notable early analysis of the Oaxaca rebellion, and one that avoided the pitfalls of either abstract denunciation or uncritical support, was “This Is What Recuperation Looks Like” by Kellen Kass, published in A Murder of Crows, no. 2, March 2007 (it can be found on line in the library section at www.libcom.org).

4 A kind of vulgar Marxism is the common currency of much of what passes for radical analysis these days. And in an era of war, economic turbulence, and a globalized capitalism that indeed has battered down all the walls of China (as if to fulfill Marx’s prediction of 1848), this should not be surprising. The campaign to “vindicate” Marx does not stop there, however, and when the term “vulgar Marxism” is used disparagingly by a writer, it usually only means that he or she is about to deploy a slightly more sophisticated argument, but one still based on Marxist categories. It is this Deeper Marxism that rules both the academic and militant left, including the parts of both that style themselves as anti-authoritarian, whose reliance on a Marxist crutch only shows their lack of autonomous critical skills. While the critique of Marxism past and present lies outside of the scope of the present essay, it is something implied in the orientation of our tendency toward renewal and reassessment in conceiving of an emancipatory social project.

5 To fully understand the dimensions of the crises that have buffeted the Mexican economy in recent decades, one must go back at least to the debt crisis of 1982, when the Mexican state - in the paradoxical position of being both a producer of oil revenues and a debtor nation receiving recycled petrodollars in the form of loans from international banks - defaulted on its debt payments. By means of a policy of austerity and privatization, Mexico qualified in 1987 for a “rescue” by international financial institutions, one negotiated by none other than the consigliere of the Bush family, James F. Baker. Further concessions on the part of Mexico would be demanded on the part of the Clinton administration as part of another “bail out” program, all of this forming a prelude to the implementation of the terms of the NAFTA treaty and, simultaneously and in response to NAFTA, the beginning of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas.

6 See the interesting points raised about the nationalist left in Mexico by the Grupo Socialista Libertario in its critique of the EZLN’s Other Campaign (translation can be found at www.collectivereinventions.org).

7 See the article by David Recondo, “Oaxaca el ocaso de un régimen,” Letras libres (Mexico), February 2007. Magón's own anarchism is discussed later in the present essay, as are the revolutionary politics of organizations such as the Alianza Magonista Zapatista.

8 Quoted in Judith Francis Zeitlin, Cultural Politics in Colonial Tehauntepec, Stanford: 2005, p. 168.

9 Alejandro Anaya Muñoz. Autonomía indígena, gobernabilidad y legitimidad en México: la legalización de usos y costumbres en Oaxaca, Mexico City: 2006.

10 For one example of this, see Brenda Aguilar, “Autonomías Latinoamericanos: Algunas reflexiones sobre Utopías Posibles,” 2008 (http://anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=7625)

11 For a Marxist critique of a radicalism based on peasant “otherness,” see Tom Brass, “Neoliberalism and the Rise of (Peasant) Nations within the Nation: Chiapas in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 32, Nos. 3&4, July/October 2005.

12 See, for example, Wilfredo Kapsoli, Ayllus del sol: anarquismo y utopía andina, Lima (1984), as well as books by Osvaldo Bayer (on the Patagonian general strike of 1921) and Sergio Grez Toso (on the history of Chilean anarchism).

13 For background on Oaxacan workers in the United States and Canada, see Lynn Stephen, Transborder Lives: Indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon, Duke University Press (2007)