May 31, 2006

Students Continue Strike in Chile

Almost 300 schools are closed
On May 19, the Instituto Nacional was occupied by students protesting that the Chilean government should spend windfall revenue earned from high copper prices on education. It was the third school occupied at that time.

Ten days later, almost 300 schools are either occupied or on strike because their demands haven't been heard by the government, according to the students.

On Monday, the students attempted to hold talks with the deputy minister of education. The minister didn't participate, although he had called the meeting.

The students abandoned the conference because some leaders that came from far away provinces, traveling more than 500 kilometers to Santiago, weren't allowed to enter the meeting, as the invitation written by the minister excluded them.

As the situation still goes unresolved, both public and private schools have asked their students to stay at home. Some student bodies are organizing cultural activities to give some meaning to this protest.

Some public universities, such as the Universidad de Chile and Universidad Tecnologica Metropolitana, are also joining the protest and will not attend classes this Tuesday in support to their fellow companions.

The demands:

- Free college entrance exams: The PSU is a test which every student applying to enter a university in Chile must take. It cost about $45, which is expensive for poor families whose children attend public schools where they pay no money to study. The students want that fee waived.

- Free transportation: Public transportation, such as the subway and buses, have a lower fee for public school students, almost 70 percent less. The demand is that transportation to school should be free because the poorest students sometimes don't have money to travel to school.

- Supress the "complete schedule": Public schools in Chile, in order to assure more pupils the chance to study, have a mid-schedule in which they attend school for five hours a day. The government obliged schools to change this from 2007 on, extending the school schedule to eight hours a day. The students think this is not the solution and they want to change this disposition.

- Change the law on education: A law that was implemented 16 years ago that students think has to be changed almost completely because it has failed to resolve problems in the public educational crisis.

This is the worst crisis in schools in Chile since 1972, where it had an ideological focus, much like this one 34 years later which struggles for a better education.

So far, the government's position is that it can not afford to sustain such cost-cutting measures for students if copper prices were to drop.

In pictures: Chile student protests



Click link to see photo essay.

Bolivian president thanks Chirac for support for gas nationalization

Bolivian President Evo Morales thanked his French counterpart Jacques Chirac on Monday for his support for Bolivia's nationalization of fossil fuel resources, and invited him to visit the opening of the Constituent Assembly, reports reaching here said.

During a visit to Chile on Friday, Chirac expressed his support for the nationalization, saying he had a lot of respect for Morales, who "had restored honor to a people which had been deprived of it for centuries."

The French president added that if he were invited, he would attend the opening of the Assembly on Aug. 6 in Sucre, Bolivia's constitutional capital.

Morales said this is the reason why he made a public invitation to Chirac.

He said he had also invited leaders from Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa, because "we are betting on a deep change in the democracy, that is to say a change for the peaceful path."

The Constituent Assembly is one of Morales's key election promises. Bolivians will choose the members of the Assembly on July 2.

Chavez Says Russia to Help Venezuela Make Rifles

CARACAS, Venezuela
Russia will help Venezuela build plants to make Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition after the United States restricted arms sales to the South American nation, President Hugo Chavez said on Tuesday.

Chavez also told a press conference in Quito, Ecuador, that a delivery of 30,000 Kalashnikov automatic rifles was due to arrive from Russia in early June.

``The Russians are going to install a Kalashnikov rifle plant and a munitions factory. So we can defend every street, every hill, every corner,'' he said in remarks broadcast in Venezuela.

Washington banned all weapons sales to Chavez's leftist government this month because of U.S. concern about his ties with Cuba and Iran and what it called his inaction against guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.

The sanctions led to a diplomatic freeze with Venezuela, a major U.S. energy supplier and the world's No. 5 oil exporter.

Chavez rattled the White House earlier with a deal to buy 100,000 Russian automatic weapons.

Earlier this year, the United States expressed concern about Spain's plans to sell $1.56 billion in military ships and planes to Venezuela.

Chavez charges the United States with orchestrating a 2002 coup that briefly toppled his government and frequently accuses the United States of planning to invade Venezuela.

``The invasion plan is prepared, we even have part of this plan. They change it of course,'' Chavez said, although he added he was working to avoid such an attack.

Washington denies it plans to invade Venezuela and says Chavez is destabilizing the region.

Russia is the world's No. 2 oil exporter. Russia's Gazprom is exploring for natural gas in Venezuela, and Russian oil major LUKOIL says it wants to invest up to $1 billion in developing Venezuelan deposits.

Bolivian president accuses U.S. of assassination attempt

by Carlos Valdez
La Paz
Leftist President Evo Morales said Tuesday the U.S. government had organized groups to kill him and said he believed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's assertion that Washington was preparing to overthrow his administration.

“I've been informed recently how the U.S. had organized teams — groups to persecute Evo Morales, to kill Evo Morales. They haven't been able to and now we're organized, from unions to this political party and they can't stop us anymore,” Mr. Morales said, without giving more details.

The U.S. Embassy in Bolivia called the charges “baseless.”

“We're supporting democracy in Bolivia in a consistent manner and are looking for a constructive relationship with the Bolivian government based on dignity, mutual respect and common interests,” the Embassy said in a statement Tuesday.

Mr. Chavez said during a visit to Bolivia last week that the U.S. government was plotting to overthrow Mr. Morales. His comments came after U.S. President George W. Bush said he was “concerned about the erosion of democracy” in Bolivia and Venezuela.

“I want you to know that what my colleague Chavez said is no lie,” Mr. Morales told reporters while inaugurating a Cuban-funded program to provide free eye surgeries in the town of Escoma, about 125 miles west of La Paz. “These historical enemies, that privatized our natural resources, especially petroleum, are conspiring, not against Evo Morales but against the changes that we've started.”

Mr. Morales, who was elected in December, nationalized Bolivia's natural gas industry earlier this month and has pledged to fight corruption and pull the poor Andean nation out of poverty.

Since taking office, Mr. Morales has had tense relations with the U.S. government, which he frequently refers to as the “empire.” He has also accused unnamed foreign energy companies of plotting against him, although he has not presented any proof.

Mr. Chavez has also repeatedly accused the United States of trying to overthrow him to seize his country's vast oil reserves.

May 30, 2006

Chavez signs oil deal with Ecuador

QUITO, Ecuador
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez signed crude oil and natural gas deals with Ecuador Tuesday in a move that extends the leftist leader's clout in Latin America.

Chavez, at the forefront of a leftist shift challenging U.S. influence in the region, visited the Ecuadorean capital weeks after Quito terminated a contract with Occidental Petroleum, straining relations with Washington and sparking fears of an oil nationalization.

Chavez's commitment to refining up to 100,000 barrels of Ecuadorean oil per day is the latest example of his use of his country's oil operations to build regional support.

The two countries agreed to create joint companies to improve Ecuadorean refineries and the transportation and storage of natural gas. The joint companies will also facilitate the exploration, production and refining of oil.

"We respect the internal politics of each country. ... We only want integration, to get closer because it is essential to the future of our people," Chavez said inside the national palace during his scheduled six-hour stay in Ecuador.

Chavez congratulated his counterpart Alfredo Palacio for recovering "Ecuador's natural resources." He was referring to Ecuador's decision to terminate Occidental's contract.

Outside the palace a cheering crowd held banners welcoming the former military officer and self-proclaimed leftist revolutionary who leads the world's No. 5 oil exporter.

In a similar trip to Bolivia last week, Chavez promised to invest $1.5 billion in the country's natural gas-dominated sector. Bolivian President Evo Morales nationalized his impoverished country's energy sector earlier this month.

Leftists in Quito voiced support for Chavez's anti-American politics. Business leaders accused him of political intervention.

Ecuadorean officials tried to lower the political tone of the visit by portraying it as technical, not political.
Ecuador oil needs

Chavez and Morales are close allies and, with Cuban President Fidel Castro, have formed a leftist alliance to counter what they call U.S. political and economic hegemony in Latin America.

The United States accuses Chavez of destabilizing the region and earlier this month President Bush said he was concerned about the erosion of democracy in Bolivia and Venezuela.

Ecuador has scarce refining capacity and this year expects to spend $1.7 billion on petroleum-based products imports, or 20 percent of the national budget.

The Andean nation stands to save $300 million a year on fuel imports through the deal with Venezuela to refine Ecuadorean crude at a lower cost. The deal will start in about 45 days, officials said.

Earlier in May, Ecuador terminated its contract with Los Angeles-based Occidental over accusations the company illegally sold part of an oil block without government authorization.

The company says it did nothing wrong and has filed an arbitration claim in Washington seeking $1 billion in damages.

State oil company Petroecuador took over operations at the oilfields, but many doubt it can keep up production for long.

Ecuador says it wants to forge a joint venture with another Latin American oil company to operate the oilfields. Venezuela's PDVSA is one of the candidates.

Bush Squares Off with Bolivia and Venezuela over Hemispheric Model

by Roger Burbach
George W. Bush has come out with harsh words for the governments of Bolivia and Venzeuela. “Let me just put it bluntly - I'm concerned about the erosion of democracy in the countries you mentioned,” Bush said in response to a question put to him about Venezuela and Bolivia. “I am going to continue to remind our hemisphere that respect for property rights and human rights is essential for all countries,” he added.

While Bush’s hostility towards Hugo Chavez of Venezuela is well known, his critical comments about Bolivia came as somewhat of a surprise, given that Evo Morales has served only four months as the country’s first Indian president and has done nothing to thwart the democratic process. As Bolivian foreign minister David Choquehuanca noted: “We are creating a participatory democracy and the world knows it. I don’t understand how the United States can say democracy is eroding...”

Bush’s true agenda is reflected in his call for “respect for property rights.” A change is taking place in South America as Morales and Chavez move to exert greater control of their energy resources and challenge US plans for a hemispheric free trade zone. As the president of the Bolivian Senate, Santos Ramirez, noted: "Bolivia and Latin America are no longer the servile democracies that tolerate...poverty and the surrendering of sovereignty."

Early in May Morales announced that Bolivia would nationalize its energy resources, particularly its natural gas exports. While no foreign corporations were expropriated out right, Morales made it clear that “the looting of our natural resources by foreign enterprises is over.”

At the same time Morales is moving to reshape the country’s commercial relations, particularly with Venezuela. This week Hugo Chavez flew to Bolivia, declaring “we are going to concretize the People’s Trade Treaty,” an accord that was recently signed between Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. It is openly pitched as an alternative to the US-backed Free Trade Area of the Americas, a trade zone based on neo-liberal principles that facilitates the expansion of multinational corporations.

Bolivia and Venezuela have signed eight different accords dealing with 200 different projects concerning energy, mining, education, sports and cultural exchanges. Most importantly Venezuela has agreed to invest over $1 billion to help industrialize Bolivia’s natural gas production, including the construction of a petrochemical complex.

Venezuela is also providing diesel fuel, which Bolivia does not produce, in exchange for the sale of soybeans. This comes at an opportune moment for Bolivia as most of its soy exports have gone to Colombia which just signed a free trade agreement with the United States. The US-Colombian accord means that cheap, subsidized US grains will flood Colombia, driving out Bolivian soybeans.

In Bolivia Morales took Chavez on a visit to Chipare, the semi-tropical region where he rose to prominence as the leader of the coca growers’ confederation. There they announced their intention to build a factory to process coca leafs for herbal teas, medicinal products, and cosmetics. This is certain to arouse the ire of the United States which for years has pursued a policy of forced eradication of coca in Chipare, leading to the virtual militarization of the region.

The burgeoning economic alliance between Venezuela and Bolivia also helps offset the difficulties that have arisen with Brazil and Argentina over Morales’ determination to exert greater control over natural gas exports. Both neighboring countries have significant investments in Bolivia’s gas fields, and both are importing gas for domestic use at prices well below the world market. At a recent international gathering of Latin American and European leaders in Vienna, Austria, Morales and President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil exchanged harsh words over efforts to draft a new accord over natural gas. While the two leaders formally made up before they left Austria, there is little doubt that Chavez’ support provides Bolivia with leverage in its negotiations with its two more powerful neighbors.

Venezuela is also signing a financial accord aimed at bolstering Bolivia’s banking and monetary system. This is intended to strengthen Morales’ hand vis-á-vis the United States and international financial institutions. The Bolivian government at the end of March announced that it would not solicit any new loans from the International Monetary Fund. The fund has aroused a great deal of antipathy in recent decades as it restricted social spending and forced the privatization of state enterprises, particularly in the tin mining industry.

The visit of Chavez to Bolivia coincides with the opening of the Exchange Fair, a project of the People’s Trade Treaty between Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba. Enterprises from all three countries participated with the goal of expanding commerce and sharing technical expertise. At the fair the vice-president of Bolivia, Alvaro Garcia Linera, criticized the US neo-liberal trade regime, asserting: “It is not necessary for small producers and entrepreneurs to subordinate themselves to financial capital…There are other forms of interdependence, other forms of globalization, other ways to generate regional exchanges of products, ideas, and necessities.” Garcia Linera concluded, “Bolivia needs the world, and it will produce for the world.”

Roger Burbach is director of the Center for the Study of the Americas, based in Berkeley, California. He is the co-author, with Jim Tarbell, of Imperial Overstretch: George W Bush and the Hubris of Empire, published by Zed Books. He has written extensively on Latin America and is currently working on a book on the social movements and the new left in Latin America.

Ramírez: OPEC should cut production

Rafael Ramírez, Energy and Petroleum minister and CEO of Venezuelan state oil giant Pdvsa Monday insisted that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) should reduce crude oil output if it is to stabilize world oil markets.

"We believe that under current market conditions, production should be cut because we are faced with high oil supply levels in world markets," the minister explained.

"If we considered market fundamentals, we should make this move (cut production). Now, however, given price levels, the ministerial meeting should discuss what is the best stance," he added.

"Oil stocks are exceeding historically high average levels. Fuel stocks are soaring. Therefore, we in Venezuela consider that prices are not the result of market fundamentals, but they are mirroring strong geopolitical tensions, for example, in Iran," he explained.

Ramírez provided some details on the 141st OPEC extraordinary meeting that is taking place in Venezuela as of June 1st.

Iranian Oil minister is arriving in Venezuela on Monday, while the other OPEC ministers are to arrive on Tuesday.

"At least 200 delegates are to attend this meeting, including ministers, OPEC governors, country representatives before OPEC, and technical teams for each delegation," he explained.

Ramírez added that the summit includes a meeting of OPEC ministers with President Hugo Chávez.

He ensured that preparations are under way as scheduled.

Venezuela Seeks to Cut Oil Output - (Can You Say I Hate Hugo?, NY Times Can)

by Simon Romero, New York Times
When President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela wraps up this week's meeting of OPEC's 11 members in Caracas with an excursion for delegates to Canaima National Park, the location of the world's tallest waterfall, it will be another chance to remind energy markets of his influence in helping drive oil prices above $70 a barrel.

Of course, most delegates to the Thursday meeting are expected to nod politely to Venezuela's calls for output cuts that could drive prices even higher, while doing the opposite by reaping all they can from the current bonanza of high prices. The oil minister of the United Arab Emirates rejected talk on Monday of a possible cut in the cartel's output quotas of 28 million barrels a day.

Mohamed Bin Dhaen al-Hamli, head of the U.A.E.'s delegation to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, told reporters in Abu Dhabi that he did "not expect a change in the production level." Officials from Iran, an ally of Venezuela and OPEC's second-largest producer after Saudi Arabia, recently said they did not expect any output cuts this week.

Still, Mr. Chávez is using the meeting as a platform to celebrate energy policies that irk the United States. The meeting is the organization's first in Caracas since 2000, when Mr. Chávez emerged triumphant from an effort to instill discipline within OPEC after oil had plunged to $8 a barrel in the late 1990's. (Oil prices ended last week at $71.37 a barrel; markets were closed on Monday for a holiday.)

One of Mr. Chávez's goals is to increase OPEC's ranks. Mr. Chávez said last week that Venezuela would back Ecuador if it decided to rejoin OPEC, following Ecuador's decision this month to expel its largest foreign investor, Occidental Petroleum of Los Angeles. Venezuela also offered to refine at subsidized rates oil exported by Ecuador, which was an OPEC member from 1973 to 1992, when it dropped out saying that it could not afford OPEC's membership fees. In another move that could add friction to the competition for oil resources between the United States and China, Sudan said last week that it was considering an invitation from Nigeria to join OPEC. With sanctions preventing American oil companies from investing in Sudan, China has emerged as a key investor in the country, Africa's third-largest oil producer after Nigeria, a longtime OPEC member, and Angola.

These efforts to enlarge OPEC, responsible for about 40 percent of the world's 84 million barrels a day of production, play directly into the ambitions of Mr. Chávez. He has been pushing for more nationalistic energy policies in Venezuela and other countries in South America like Bolivia, which has received generous financial backing from Venezuela.

It was a Venezuelan, after all, who was largely responsible 46 years ago for creating OPEC by modeling the group in part on the Texas Railroad Commission, an entity formed to prevent wild plunges in oil prices in the United States due to overproduction. Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, Venezuela's oil minister at the time, persuaded four nations from the Middle East to join OPEC at a meeting in Baghdad in September 1960.

While that meeting set the stage for the nationalization of oil assets in OPEC countries like Venezuela and Saudi Arabia in the 1970's, by the 1990's Venezuela was widely considered a saboteur of OPEC's efforts to raise oil prices by persistently producing above its official quotas and inviting foreign oil companies to help expand output.

It may seem like a distant memory in today's context of more belligerent rhetoric, but Venezuela had plans to double its oil production to seven million barrels a day before Mr. Chávez was elected president in 1998. Mr. Chávez reversed that policy, while also persuading OPEC members that output cuts, not ambitious investment programs, were needed to boost oil revenues.

"The Chávez administration doesn't care about market share," said David Mares, a professor of political science at the University of California at San Diego who closely follows Venezuela's energy industry. "They care about the absolute amount of money coming into the country."

Few of Mr. Chávez's critics within Venezuela argue that high oil prices, whether driven earlier by his push for production discipline within OPEC or by today's robust demand for oil by China, India and the United States, have not increased Venezuela's financial clout. Oil export revenue climbed by $4.1 billion in the first quarter from a year earlier, increasing Venezuela's current account surplus by $2.8 billion to $7.5 billion, according to Barclays Capital.

Venezuela's stagnant oil production, however, points as much to a bounty lost as one gained. Venezuela produces just 2.2 million to 2.5 million barrels of oil a day, according to most analysts. That figure is down considerably from its output peak of about 3.5 million barrels a day, reached before Mr. Chávez purged Petroleos de Venezuela, the national oil company, of middle- and upper-management employees who had shut the company down in an effort to destabilize his presidency.

Meanwhile, OPEC's most pivotal member, Saudi Arabia, has comfortably raised production in recent years, even though much of its excess capacity is not easy to refine. With almost every OPEC member producing flat-out in an effort to meet unprecedented global demand, Venezuela lost an opportunity to earn even more from oil.

"The Saudis took their market share," said Amy Myers Jaffe, associate director of the energy program at Rice University. "They're pumping a million barrels a day more at $70 a barrel, while Venezuela is pumping about a million barrels a day less."

It may be with somewhat token symbolism, then, if Mr. Chávez calls for more cuts in OPEC's output this week. For Mr. Chávez to enhance his influence inside OPEC and to finance his ambitious foreign and domestic policies, analysts estimate that Venezuela needs to carry out plans to double its production to 5 million barrels a day.

It remains to be seen how this increase can be accomplished as Venezuela exerts greater control over international oil companies, which account for as much as half of its oil production. Venezuelan energy officials have signaled in recent days that they would seek up to a 60 percent controlling stake in exploration projects in the Orinoco River basin, one of the world's most promising, though politically complicated, oil reserves.

May 29, 2006

Mexico: Atenco leader speaks from hiding

by Bill Weinberg
On May 27, América del Valle, leader of the Peoples' Front in Defense of the Land, in hiding since the May 3 violence at San Salvador Atenco, spoke to the international Telesur TV network from a clandestine location. She said the human rights violations against the people of Atenco demonstrate that Mexican President Vicente Fox wants to show he "maintains a firm and strong hand over those at the bottom," before he steps down from power. She said the police violence at her village was an attempt to "intimidate" Mexicans who stand up for their rights.

"In this country, when someone stands up for their rights, when they fight for the rights of their people, the system feels attacked and responds by persecuting those people and their causes. It wants to annihilate them," added del Valle.

Del Valle's father has been in custody since the protests on May 3. "Right now, there is an arrest warrant over my head, which could mean prison time for me," she said.

On May 25, Amnesty International released a report denouncing the "countless cases of human rights violations" that remain unresolved in Mexico, while Mexico's National Human Rights Commission is moving ahead with an investigation into the events at Atenco. Ironically, the controversy comes just as Mexico has been nominated to the presidency of the UN Human Rights Council. (Telesur, May 27)

On May 28, thousands gathered at Mexico City's Angel of Independence plaza for a rally led by Zapatista Subcommander Marcos to demand freedom for the Atenco prisoners, 27 of whom remain on hunger strike. (La Jornada, May 29)

The facetiously-acronymed Coordinadora Insurreccional Anarquista (Anarchist Insurrectional Coordinating Body, or CIA) was among the many Mexican activist groups which have released statements in solidarity with Atenco.

The daily La Jornada reports mobilizations in solidarity with Atenco from Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala and elsewhere around the Americas. (La Jornada, May 25)

All sources online at Chiapas95.

See our last post on the Mexico crisis.

Uribe, the US's Latin American Lap Dog "Wins"

[From Washington Post - Spin anyone?]
Law-and-order President Alvaro Uribe was re-elected in a landslide Sunday in Colombia's most peaceful elections in more than a decade, strengthening the U.S. ally's mandate to crack down on armed groups and drug traffickers.
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[From Council on Foreign Relations]
...Uribe's opponents to claim the president is overly beholden to American interests: "Colombia has many products to sell, but the country is not for sale" (Pravda)
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[From politicalcrossroads.blogspot.com]

Another day, yet another example of biased BBC journalism. In the forthcoming Colombian general elections, right of centre candidate and current President, Alvaro Uribe is set to buck the trend of Latin American countries electing leftwing socialist leaders. However, despite the fact that Mr Uribe is expected to win 57% of the vote and has rarely dropped below a 70% popularity rating in the past 4 years, the Biased Broadcasting Corporation strangely managed to find six out of six people who I very much doubt will be voting for Mr Uribe. These include a former paramilitary, a former left-wing rebel, a medical student, a journalist, an extremely critical former hostage and a supposedly displaced person.

Typically the BBC go on opinions rather than facts, especially if you contrast the BBC article with a Times newspaper article on the same day. The Times article details why the right lead in popularity by a substantial margin – rather than the biased BBC, “we’re not going to tell you what’s really going on” approach.

Click here to see the BBC online article and here to see the Times online piece.

*

And finally, Time Magazine's story called "Washington's Best Friend in Latin America"

Venezuela promises Bolivia 2 billion US dollars aid

Venezuela's aid to Bolivia will total some 2 billion US dollars but does not mean interference in the country’s internal affairs said President Evo Morales amid growing criticism from the opposition over Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez alleged involvement.

The official Abi news agency reported that last week's visit to Bolivia by Chavez and Cuban Vice President Carlos Lage was merely a show of support for Latin American integration.

Chavez and Lage presence in Bolivia coincided with the launching by President Morales of the campaign for the July election of delegates for a Constitutional Assembly. Mr. Morales is intent in introducing “Socialist” oriented reforms and eliminating open market policies in the reformed constitution.

Morales and Chavez signed 16 cooperation agreements providing financial assistance to resource-rich but impoverished Bolivia in several areas.

Among the 16 cooperation agreements signed was one committing Venezuela to purchase 100 million US dollars in Bolivian bonds and another associating Bolivian government owned energy company YPFB with Venezuela’s PDVSA.

The two companies will be involved in joint exploration and production operations in Bolivia which has the second largest proven natural gas reserves of South America.

Venezuela also pledged to invest some 1.5 billion US dollars in Bolivia's gas industry.

According to a survey published Sunday in La Paz, 39% of Bolivians consider Venezuela their country's best friend; however when asked which country would most bolster economic relations, 24% replied United States.

The list then ranks Brazil, 16%; Venezuela 12%; Chile 10%; and Spain 9%.

The poll from Apoyo, Opinion y Mercado was done in early May including residents in Bolivia’s main cities.

May 28, 2006

Chavez says US working for coup in Bolivia

CARACAS, Venezuela
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on Sunday accused the United States of trying to stir up a military rebellion against his left-wing Bolivian ally President Evo Morales.

Chavez, at the forefront of a leftist shift that is challenging American influence in Latin America, blames Washington for a 2002 coup attempt that briefly toppled his own government.

"The (U.S.) Embassy in Bolivia is already whispering in the ears of the Bolivian military to turn them against the government of Evo Morales," Chavez said during his weekly television program, which was broadcast from Bolivia.

"There is a plan against Bolivia and the U.S. ambassador in Bolivia is the head of this plan," he said. "The devil is everywhere."

Chavez is visiting Bolivia to sign deals for $1.5 billion in energy investments in the impoverished nation.

It was the latest salvo in a war of words between Chavez, a self-proclaimed revolutionary and leader of the world's No. 5 oil exporter, and the administration of
President George W. Bush.

Last week, Bush said he was concerned about the erosion of democracy in Venezuela and Bolivia. The White House has accused Venezuela of being uncooperative in the U.S. war against terrorism and of promoting instability in the region.

Chavez and Morales are close allies and, with Cuban President
Fidel Castro, have formed a leftist alliance that aims to counter what they call U.S. political and economic hegemony in Latin America.

"Gringo go home," Chavez, a former paratrooper, said during Sunday's broadcast. He said the U.S. government is willing to pay soldiers to turn them against the Bolivian government.

"The gringos offer lots of money," he said. "There are soldiers who sell themselves to the
CIA ... and they're paid by Washington."

Morales surprised investors by nationalizing the energy industry on May 1 in an apparent move to cement his power and build support ahead of elections this year for a special assembly to rewrite the constitution.

Chavez, who is running for reelection in December, has used oil income to finance social programs for the poor and solidify his support in the region.

Poverty Rates In Venezuela: Getting The Numbers Right

by Mark Weisbrot, Luis Sandoval, David Rosnick
Introduction

Over the past year, the statement that poverty in Venezuela has increased under the government of President Hugo Chávez has appeared in scores of major newspapers, on major television and radio programs, and even journals such as Foreign Affairs[1] and Foreign Policy.[2] (See Appendix for a sample of such statements.) These statements have only rarely been contested or corrected.

For example, writing in the May/June 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, Mexico’s former Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda stated that “Venezuela’s poverty figures and human development indices have deteriorated since 1999, when Chávez took office.”[3] A May 11, 2006 news article in the Financial Times was headlined “Chavez opts for oil-fuelled world tour while progress slows on social issues; Challengers point to failures in housing and poverty ahead of December's elections,”[4] and questions whether poverty has been reduced under the Chávez administration.

This paper looks at the available data on poverty in Venezuela, which show a reduction in poverty since 1999, as well as related economic data. The paper also briefly notes how some of the mistakes surrounding the discussion of this issue have been made. Finally, we also look at the impact of the provision of health care to the poor, which has been greatly expanded over the last few years.

Poverty Rates: Cash Income

Table 1 shows the number of Venezuelan households and people living in poverty from 1997 to 2005, at half-year intervals. The household poverty rate declined sharply from 55.6 percent in the beginning of 1997, as a result of the relatively strong growth (6.4 percent) of that year. It continued to decline, as the economy slowed to a standstill in 1998, and reached 42.8 percent in the first half of 1999, when President Chavez took office. There was some further decline in the poverty rate to 39 percent in 2001. But in 2002 poverty began to rise, surging to a peak of 55.1 percent for the second half of 2003. This was driven overwhelmingly by the oil strike (December 2002 – February 2003), which crippled the economy and caused a sharp downturn. Capital flight and political instability prior to the oil strike, including an unsuccessful military coup in April of 2002, also contributed to a severe recession that saw GDP decline by 28.1 percent from the fourth quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of 2003.[5]

The economy then began to recover and grew very rapidly– 17.9 percent in 2004, and 9.3 percent in 2005. As a result of this recovery, the poverty rate dropped to 37.9 percent for the second half of 2005, the latest data available.

Thus if we compare the latest available data to the start of the present government, the household poverty rate fell nearly 5 percentage points – from 42.8 percent in the beginning of 1999 to 37.9 percent in the second half of 2005. The household poverty rate was thus reduced by 12.9 percent. Measuring individuals instead of households, the poverty rate decreased by 6.3 percentage points –from 50 percent of the population to 43.7 percent. That was a 14.4 percent reduction in poverty. Since the economy has continued to grow rapidly this year (first quarter growth came in at 9.4 percent), the poverty rate is almost certainly significantly lower today.

How then have so many people reached a different conclusion? The most common mistake has been to use the data from the first half of 2004, which was gathered in the first quarter of that year. The household poverty rate at that time was 53.1 percent, which is of course up enormously from 1999. There are several things wrong with using this measure. Most importantly, this poverty rate is measuring the impact of the oil strike and recession of 2002-2003.

Poverty rates are very sensitive to expansion and downturns in the economy, so to compare 1999 with the first quarter of 2004, leaving off the subsequent recovery, is meaningless and misleading. As noted above, the Venezuelan economy grew by 17.9 percent in 2004, and by 9.3 percent in 2005. We would expect and, in fact, did see a massive reduction in poverty from an economic recovery of this magnitude. So most of the news reports and articles alleging an increase in poverty under the Chávez administration are analogous to comparing winter temperatures to spring temperatures, and concluding on that basis that there is no global warming.

Also, since a preliminary estimate of poverty rates for 2005 (38.5 percent) was released in September of that year, it is not clear why anyone would have used the out-of-date numbers. The economy had by that time already grown by more than 18 percent[6] since the first quarter 2004 numbers were collected; it should therefore have been clear that the early 2004 numbers, which reflected the prior recession, were a very serious overestimate of the poverty rate.

Some articles and reports continue to rely on this out-of-date, early 2004 data, questioning the more recent data as somehow not comparable, or as not plausible.[7] For example, last week’s report from the Financial Times:

“Early last year, Venezuela's National Statistics Institute said 53 per cent of the population lived in poverty at the end of 2004, 9.2 points higher than in early 1999, at the start of the Chávez government. Irked by the numbers, the president ordered a change in INE's "methodology". Shortly after, it announced that, in mid-2005, only 39.5 per cent of people lived in poverty - a 14.5 point "improvement" in a few months.”[8]

There are several mistakes here. First, as noted above and on the National Statistics Institute (INE) web site, the 53 percent figure is from the beginning of 2004, not the end; since the economy grew 17.9 percent over that year, that makes a very big difference. Second, according to the INE, there has been no change in the institute’s methodology; and there is no evidence that it has changed.[9] The latest figure of 39.5 percent, for the second half of 2005, still measures only cash income.[10]

Third, the 14.5 percent drop in the poverty rate from the beginning of 2004 to the second half of 2005 is not at all unusual given the amount of economic growth during this period. Unemployment fell from 17.1 percent in February 2004 to 10.7 percent in February of 2006.[11]

For example, if we look at what happened to poverty in Argentina, where a similar amount of growth took place during 2003-2005, we find a much steeper reduction in the poverty rate. During this period, the percentage of households living in poverty fell from 41.2 percent for the first half of 2003 to 22.5 for the second half of 2005.[12] This is a drop of 18.7 percentage points, or a 45.4 percent reduction in the number of households living below the poverty line.

So there is no economic reason to question the decline in the poverty rate that occurred from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2005. The amount of poverty reduction that occurred is also consistent with econometric estimates of the elasticity of poverty rates with respect to economic growth.[13]

Non-Cash Income

As noted above, the reduction in poverty since 1999 measures only cash income. This, however, does not really capture the changes in the living standards of the poor in Venezuela, since there have been major changes in non-cash benefits and services in the last few years. To take an analogy from the other direction, imagine that in the United States, the Medicaid and Food Stamp programs were abolished. This would have an enormous impact on the poor population of the United States, even though their cash income would have remained the same.

In Venezuela, since 2003 a series of programs have been established to provide health care for the poor, subsidized food, as well as increased access to education. For example, an estimated 14.5 million people, or 54% percent of the population, now receives free health care through the Barrio Adentro program.[14] An estimated 40 to 47 percent of the population (around 10.7 to 12.5 million people) buys subsidized food through the Mercal program, at discounts averaging 41 to 44 percent.[15] A May 2006 report[16] by Datanalisis, a survey research firm associated with the opposition in Venezuela, found that Mercal represented 47.3 percent share of total sales in the food distribution market in March 2006, compared to 34.7 percent in October 2005.[17]

Access to free health care is a major improvement in the lives of the poor, and one that does not show up in the standard measure of poverty. It is not possible to adjust the poverty rate in a way that fully accounts for this change. For example, we could estimate the value of the health services provided free to the poor and add that to their income. However, the value of these services is so large relative to the poverty threshold that this method would move the vast majority of poor people over the poverty line.

Another way to incorporate the value of health care services to the poor is to take an estimate of what they would be spending out-of-pocket on health care if it were not provided by the government. This method vastly understates the value of these services to the poor, since in the absence of government provision many poor people simply go without needed health care, and therefore their out-of-pocket spending does not represent their actual health care needs.

Nonetheless it is worth looking at this estimate of the value of health care services to the poor. There are no recent data available specifically for Venezuela, but based on expenditure surveys of poor people in other middle-income countries,[18] we can take as an estimate that the poor in Venezuela would spend about 5 percent of their income on health care.

Table 2 shows the impact of these health care benefits on poverty if we take into account the money that people below the poverty line would spend on health care in the absence of the government’s provision of health care. A range of estimates is provided, based on expenditures of 4 to 6 percent of income. As can be seen, the present poverty rate would be reduced from 37.9 percent to between 36.2 and 35.3 percent; the mid-range value would be 35.8 percent.

It is important to emphasize that this estimate of the impact of health care spending on the poor does not really measure the benefits that they derive from free health care. It is only estimating the money that they would otherwise spend on health care and adjusting the poverty rate accordingly. But the poor would often do without health care if it were not provided by the government, and therefore suffer from worse health, lower income, and lower life expectancy. So the value of these health care services is much greater than the amount that they would have spent out-of-pocket in the absence of the government programs.

Finally, the government has steadily increased overall social spending from 8.2 percent of GDP in 1998 to 11.2 percent of GDP in 2005[19] and is expected to reach 12.5 percent of GDP in 2006.[20] On education, for example, real government spending per capita has increased by 80 percent from 1998 to 2005, with public spending on education at more than 4 percent of GDP annually during this period. Through the main literacy program, known as “Misión Robinson”, an estimated 1.4 million people (or more than 5 percent of the total population) of different ages have learned how to write and read.[21] These programs have also benefited the poor, again in ways that are not reflected or feasibly incorporated into the measured poverty rate.

In conclusion, there is no ambiguity as to the decline in poverty in Venezuela over the last seven years, even if we look only at cash income. Reports to the contrary, although numerous, are simply in error.

Appendix

The following is a sample of statements appearing in major media or foreign policy journals that deny and/or misrepresent the decline in poverty that has taken place in Venezuela under the present government. This list goes back to October 2005 because a preliminary estimate of the poverty rate for 2005 (38.5 percent) was released in September of that year. Also, by that time, the economy had already grown more than 18 percent since the early 2004 numbers were collected; it should therefore have been clear that the early 2004 numbers were a serious overestimate of the current poverty rate.[22]

Foreign Affairs, article by Jorge Casteñeda: “Latin America’s Left Turn,” May/June 2006

“Venezuela’s poverty figures and human development indices have deteriorated since 1999, when Chávez took office.”

Financial Times, news report: “Chavez opts for oil-fuelled world tour while progress slows on social issues; Challengers point to failures in housing and poverty ahead of December's elections,” May 11, 2006

“In one area - poverty - the government is adamant that it scores top marks. But there are doubts over the reliability of official data.

Early last year, Venezuela's National Statistics Institute said 53 per cent of the population lived in poverty at the end of 2004, 9.2 points higher than in early 1999, at the start of the Chavez government.

Irked by the numbers, the president ordered a change in INE's "methodology". Shortly after, it announced that, in mid-2005, only 39.5 per cent of people lived in poverty - a 14.5 point "improvement" in a few months.”

Foreign Policy, article by Javier Corrales: “Hugo Boss,” January 1, 2006

“Chavez has failed to improve any meaningful measure of poverty, education, or equity.”

Washington Post, editorial board, editorial: “A Leader for the 21st Century,” January 18, 2006

“In Venezuela, poverty rose from 43 to 53 percent during Mr. Chavez's first six [sic] years in office.”

Foreign Affairs, article by Michael Shifter: “In Search of Hugo Chávez,” May/June 2006, Vol 85, Number 3

“Available data of these measures’ effect are mixed and not altogether reliable. According to the Venezuelan government’s National Institute of Statistics, poverty rose from 43 to 54 percent during Chávez’s first four years in office . . . The government has also just changed its methodology for measuring poverty to reflect improvements in non-income criteria such as access to health services and education, which, it argued, were not reflected in past figures.”

CNN “Insight,” quote from CNN host Jonathan Mann, October 17, 2006

“…More than half of Venezuela's 25 million people were found to be below the poverty line. Then the government found a new way to measure the poverty line and the numbers suddenly got better.

Changing the numbers, changing the landscape, changing things in general is what Hugo Chavez is all about.”

PBS “NewsHour”, quote from guest Alvaro Vargas Llosa on program: “No Resolution in Hemispheric Free Trade Talks,” November 8, 2005

“When Chavez took power six years ago, about 43, 45 percent of his people were poor, and now that's about 53 percent, even though the price of a barrel of oil has gone up from about $15 to over $60.”

The New York Times, column by John Tierney: “The Idiots Abroad,” November 8, 2005

“The new wave of populists is led by Chavez, who's been using the recent windfall in oil revenues to expand government and solidify his hold on power. But even while $100 million in oil money pours into Venezuela every day ($60 million of that from those terrible gringos north of the Rio Grande), the poverty rate has risen above 50 percent.”

Washington Post, column by Jackson Diehl: “Buying Support In Latin America,” September 26, 2005

“In Chavez's Venezuela, the [poverty] rate has risen from 43 percent in 1999, the year he took office, to 53 percent last year, according to government statistics. During this same period Venezuelan oil revenue, which makes up most of the government's income, roughly doubled.”

Miami Herald, column by Andres Oppenheimer: “Chavez having propaganda field day at U.S. expense,” November 5, 2005

“If I were advising Bush, I would tell him to send some spin doctors to the press center, and expose Chavez as a sham who -- according to Venezuela's own National Institute of Statistics -- has increased poverty by 11 percent during his first five years, despite enjoying the biggest oil boom in Venezuela's history.”

Miami Herald, column by Andres Oppenheimer: “A miracle! Venezuela's poverty has suddenly fallen,” October 27, 2005

“How interesting! Just a few months after Venezuela's official statistics institute reported that poverty had increased by 11 percent since President Hugo Chavez took office in 1999, the same institution is now reporting -- after a public scolding by the president -- that poverty has suddenly plummeted to pre-1999 levels. …

My conclusion: If Venezuela's INE is right, and wants to maintain its reputation of unbiased economic reporting, it should accept some adult supervision and open its books to independent economists, like most governments do.

Otherwise, I will have to conclude that it is following Cuba's example, and has begun publishing its own happy figures, which nobody can independently corroborate. Miracles may exist, but most of us find it hard to believe in them.”

Miami Herald, column by Andres Oppenheimer: “Chavez Deserves Prize for Economic Bumbling,” October 9, 2005

“Chavez can claim the dubious achievement of having increased Venezuela's poverty despite the country's biggest oil boom in recent decades.

Indeed, since I disclosed in this column in March that Venezuela's official National Institute of Statistics (INE) had reported that poverty rose by 10 percent during Chavez's first five years in office, several international institutions have reported equally negative figures.

The INE, you may recall, said that poverty in Venezuela rose from 43 percent to 53 percent between 1999 and December 2004. Subsequently, Chavez lashed out against the INE, saying that it reflected the international ''neoliberal'' standards of measuring poverty, which according to him were not suitable for a ''socialist'' country such as Venezuela.

Others Agree

But now, other international organizations -- including the United Nations and the World Bank -- are painting a similar picture of Venezuela's social involution.

As strange as it sounds, they say poverty is rising in Venezuela despite the fact that world oil prices have soared from $8 a barrel when Chavez took office in 1999 to about $62 a barrel today.”

Los Angeles Times, column by contributing editor Sergio Munoz: “The Santa of the Tropics,” March 5, 2006

“After seven years as president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez's brand of populism has produced social catastrophe and economic disaster for Venezuelans, including the poor he champions.

Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenue -- $49 billion last year alone -- and social spending that includes free medical services, the country's poor are poorer, schools have not improved and the general standard of living has declined, according to a recent United Nations Human Development Report.”

Associated Press Worldstream, news report by Marcel Honore: “More than 1,000 attend opposition unity rally ahead of congressional elections,” October 15, 2005

“Critics accuse Chavez of becoming increasingly authoritarian and dangerously dividing this South American nation of 26 million along class lines. They say his left-leaning policies have increased poverty in the world's fifth-largest oil exporter.”


Mark Weisbrot is co-director, Luis Sandoval is a research assistant, and David Rosnick is a research associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Dean Baker provided valuable comments, and Nihar Bhatt and Kathryn Bogel provided valuable research assistance.

1 Castañeda, Jorge G., “Latin America’s Left Turn,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006.

2 Corrales, Javier, “Hugo Boss,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2006.

3 Castañeda, op cit. Although this paper does not deal with this question, it is worth noting that the UNDP Human Development Index for Venezuela has improved from 1999-2005 (from 0.765 to 0.772); and since the latest (2005) HDI is based on 2003, when the economy was in a deep recession, more recent data will show substantial improvements in the HDI for Venezuela as it becomes available.

4 Webb-Vidal, Andy, “Chavez opts for oil-fuelled world tour while progress slows on social issues Challengers point to failures in housing and poverty ahead of December's elections,” Financial Times, May 11, 2006.

5 This is using seasonally adjusted data for quarterly GDP (Banco Central de Venezuela, http://www.bcv.org.ve/ ).

6 From the first quarter of 2004 to the third quarter of 2005, also using seasonally adjusted data (Banco Central de Venezuela, http://www.bcv.org.ve/ ).

7 Michael Shifter, writing in Foreign Affairs (May-June 2006) notes the increase in poverty from 43 to 54 percent during Chávez’s first four years in office, and then states that the government has “just changed its methodology for measuring poverty to reflect improvements in non-income criteria such as access to health services and education, which, it argued, were not reflected in past figures.”

8 Webb-Vidal, Andy, op cit.

9 Elías Eljuri, INE’s President, quoted in a Miami Herald article stated that, “There is an opposition campaign against the INE…When I reported that poverty had risen [during Chavez's first four years in office], I was their hero. Now that the economy has grown and I'm reporting that poverty has dropped, I've suddenly become a liar,” Andres Oppeheimer, “A miracle! Venezuela's poverty has suddenly fallen,” Miami Herald, October 27, 2005.

10 The INE also has alternative measures of poverty other than the poverty rate used here, such as the Human Development Index for Venezuela (based on the Human Development Index methodology of the UNDP), the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) method (advanced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLAC), and the Social Well-being Index (Índice de Bienestar Social), all of which attempt at incorporating poverty-related factors other than cash income.

11 We are comparing February 2004 to February 2006 because the data are not seasonally adjusted. In Venezuela, as in developing countries generally, the unemployment rate does not have the same meaning as it does in high-income countries, in that many people who are severely underemployed are counted as employed. Nonetheless this change in the unemployment rate is significant.

12 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC), República de Argentina. Data available online at: http://www.indec.gov.ar/.

13 See, e.g., Mejia, J. A., and R. Vos. (1997), “Poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Inventory, 1980-95,” Working Paper Series 1-4, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C. Available online at: http://cas.umkc.edu/econ/economics/faculty/Kostzer/Poverty-lines.pdf

14 Rico, R. and Alva C. (2005), “Las misiones sociales venezolanas promueven la inclusión y la equidad. La revolución bolivariana sorprende al mundo,” Fundación Escuela de Gerencia Social, Ediciones FEGS, Caracas.

15 “Impacto Social de la Misión Mercal,” INE, Caracas, Sept. 2005. Available online at: http://www.ine.gov.ve.

16 “Mercal es el lugar más visitado para comprar alimentos,” Datanalisis, May 2006. Available online at: http://www.datanalisis.com.ve).

17 In principle, the INE poverty rate should incorporate the impact of subsidized food on the poor, simply by taking into account the prices that poor people pay for food, in calculating the food basket on which the poverty line is based. The INE publishes the cost of the food basket each month, and it is not clear whether the full impact of the Mercal prices have been taken into account; if they are not, then the INE poverty rate would be overestimating the actual poverty rate.

18 See, e.g., “Determinación del gasto familiar e ingreso familiar, canasta básica de alimentos y líneas de pobreza,” Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos (DGEEC), Paraguay, July 2003; “Gastos de los hogares,” INDEC, Argentina (http://www.indec.gov.ar); “Gasto de los hogares,” INEGI, Mexico.

19 Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales para Venezuela (SISOV), http://www.sisov.mpd.gov.ve.

20 “Consolidar el crecimiento económico con menor inflación y más inversión social y productiva,” Boletín Especial No. 41(2005), Ministerio de Finanzas, Venezuela.

21 Rico R. and Alva C., op cit.

22 Long before the preliminary numbers were released (i.e. for most of 2005), it was clear that the early 2004 numbers overestimated the current poverty rate, due to the extraordinarily rapid growth of 2004.

Original source / relevant link:
Center for Economic and Policy Research

Tumultuous opening to II UNT National Congress

Invited as one of the official observers by the UNT (National Union of Workers), VSC witnessed the revolutionary passion of the Venezuelan delegates who came from all parts of the country to Caracas for this II UNT National Congress, which is taking place from May 25th - 27th, in the Salon Venezuela, in the Military Circle of Fuerte Tiuna.

The UNT in its embryonic form was conceived on April 5th 2002, exactly one week before President Chavez was taken prisoner by the fascist coup mongers of the Venezuelan military, and the US lackeys belonging to civil society and the historically corrupt high bourgeoisie. In the intervening last three years, the UNT has gone from being a fertilized embryo to the dominant trade union movement in Venezuela. Currently 16 national unions and 700 local trade unions are now affiliated to the UNT, consigning the traitors of the CTV (Venezuelan Workers Confederation) to the status of an empty organisational shell, with little or no grassroots support.

This fact was evidenced by the overwhelming attendance of UNT affiliated workers for the Congress on registration day May 25th, when at least double the numbers of expected attendees turned up to be registered. The Salon Venezuela has a maximum capacity of 2500 people, and the result that day was that half of the potential delegates returned, disappointed, to their home states. Registration procedure turned into a marathon and lasted more than 12 hours testing the patience of even the most hardened and committed revolutionary trade unionists. VSC recommends that next year’s Congress should be held in the Poliedro (capacity of some 14000) and that pre Congress selection and procedures should be smoothed out and all unnecessary bureaucracy unceremoniously eliminated. By 10pm on Thursday May 25th all identification badges had run out.

With the Congress due to be installed from 10am on Friday May 26th, VSC was witness to huge queues one and a half hours before the official starting time waiting to enter the Congress building. Two hours later, the Salon Venezuela was bursting at the seams and there was a sense of great expectation in the air, as the organisers announced multiple greetings from the stage to the many unions and national delegations present.

The primary reason for the enthusiasm was the fact that this Congress was billed as a “grassroots event” where the workers themselves would take Congress decisions and not the ruling representational cliques as was always traditionally the case during the 40 years of corrupt CTV dominance in the Venezuelan trade union scenario.

For this II UNT Congress the main points to be debated were:

1. Mobilise and organise workers and people.
2. Develop an alternative economic and social plan to be discussed by the workers.
3. Democratise the UNT.
4. Combat all legal impunity of the 2002 coup mongers and traitors to the homeland.
5. Repudiate imperialist inference.
6. Transcend capitalism, fight for socialism and struggle for workers power, free from bosses and bureaucrats.

In United States, critics affirm failure of anti-Cuba policy

WASHINGTON, D.C.
May 25
Denounce latest report by so-called Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba

Representatives of social groups and political science institutions affirmed the failure of U.S. policy, according to an EFE dispatch from the U.S. capital.

At a joint news conference, members of the Center for International Policy (CIP), the Latin American Working Group, the Washington Office on Latin America, Church World Service and the National Council of the Churches of Christ, criticized Washington’s interference in Cuban matters, and its predictable attempt to reinforce those measures.

This criticism comes on the eve of the publication of a new report by the so-called Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, an interventionist monster created by President Bush at the urging of former Batista dictatorship collaborators who hope to regain the assets they stole until 1959.

No recommendation or punitive measure that the commission might propose or that the government decides to implement will make the regime of Fidel Castro fall, affirmed Wayne Smith, a CIP expert and former officer of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana

In his opinion, any proposals by that commission “will have no vital effect,” just as the ones proposed in 2004 failed to do so.

The so-called Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba proposed at the time new restrictions on travel to the island for Cubans resident in the United States and made it harder to send remittances.

The U.S. State Department is expected to release a second report by the commission in a few days, which is expected to include a series of recommendations on how Washington can influence the Cuban people.

According to government sources quoted in the U.S. media, the new report will not include any “drastic” measures, but it will contain suggestions on intensifying the U.S. blockade on the island.

It is very likely that they will be proposals as “unreal” as the previous, and that will only serve to aggravate the suffering of the Cuban people, according to a joint press release by the social organizations that reject U.S. policy on Cuba.

Cuba is far from being isolated and there is no sign that its economy is on the verge of collapse, the press release says.

May 27, 2006

Latin America, the EU and the US: The New Polarities

by James Petras
A new and complex series of social and national polarities in the Western Hemisphere have dominated political life over the past few years. At the beginning of the new millennium the national confrontation was between Cuba and the US/EU, and the social confrontations between the rural/Indian and urban/unemployed movements and a continent-wide collection of neoliberal regimes. This polarization resulted from the previous 25 years (between 1975-2000), the “Golden Age,” of imperial pillage. Massive legal and illegal transfers of property, wealth, profits, interest and royalty payments flowed from Latin America to the US and the EU. The most lucrative public enterprises valued at more than $350 billion dollars were privatized without any of the constitutional niceties and eventually ended up in the hands of US, Spanish and other European multi-national corporations (MNCs) and banks. Presidential decrees bypassed congress and the electorate and dictated a privileged place for foreign capital. Protests by Congress, the electorate, and national auditors were ignored. The “Golden Age” of multinational capital coincided with the reign of kleptocratic electoral regimes hailed in European and North American political circles and echoed in the mass media as the era of “Democracy and Free Markets.” The US/EU MNCs and Banks’ unmitigated plunder between 1975 and 2005 was worth over $950 billion. Plunder without development inevitably led to a general socio-economic crisis and near collapse of the imperial-centered model of capitalist accumulation in Argentina (1998-2002), Ecuador (1996-2006) Bolivia (2002-2005), and Brazil (1998-2005). Beginning in the early 1990s massive extra-parliamentary socio-political movements emerged throughout most of Latin America and were accompanied by large-scale popular uprisings, deposing ten incumbent neoliberal client “Presidents” of the US/EU: Three in Ecuador and Argentina, two in Bolivia, one each in Venezuela and Brazil.



In retrospect, it is clear that the new wave of potentially revolutionary socio-political movements reached their pinnacle of power by 2002. With massive support, widespread legitimacy, facing a corrupt, discredited and an internally divided bourgeois political class and crisis-ridden economies, the socio-political movements were in a strong position to initiate comprehensive structural changes, if they could transform social power into state power.



But the mass movements faltered, their leaders stopped at the gates of the Executive palace. Instead they looked upward toward new and recycled “center-left” electoral politicians to replace the old, discredited parties and leaders of the neoliberal right. By 2003, the massive social movements began to ebb, as many leaders were co-opted by the new wave of self-described “center-left” politicians. The promises of “social transformations” were reduced to patronage, subsidies and orthodox macro-economic policies following the same neoliberal dogma. Yet, in some countries, the mass struggles of the 1990s/2002 led to new political regimes, which were neither US clients nor free of neoliberal influence, namely Venezuela and Bolivia. By 2006 a new complex configuration emerged in which national polarizations to a significant extent overshadowed social class divisions. The new international divide found the EU and the US on one side and Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia on the other. This primary polarization finds expression in Latin America between, on the one hand, a “New Right” neoliberal pole of ex-leftists and pseudo-populist Central and South American clients, and, on the other hand, of national populists in Bolivia and Venezuela. In between are a large group of countries, which can move in either direction. The “New Right-Free Market” advocates include the Lula regime in Brazil, outgoing President Fox in Mexico, five Central American regimes, the Vazquez government in Uruguay, the Uribe “State Terrorist” regime in Colombia, the Bachelet and soon-to-depart Toledo governments in Chile and Peru.



“In between” is the Kirchner government in Argentina, reflecting a desire to deepen commercial ties with Venezuela, neutralize internal nationalist-populist pressures and promote a mixed national-foreign capitalist alliance with the US, EU and China. Ecuador, the Caribbean countries, Nicaragua and possibly Peru are sites of competition. Because of petroleum subsidies, the entire Caribbean (with the exception of the Dominican Republic) has refused to politically support the EU/US against Venezuela/Bolivia, even as they seek to promote market access to northern markets. Outside of Europe and North America, in the non-aligned movement, China, Russia, Iran and some of the Arab oil producing states have taken, overtly or discretely, the side of the Cuban-Venezuelan-Bolivian nationalist alliance.



Intersecting with the nationalist divisions are class polarizations, the strongest points of inflexion are found in Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rico, Mexico, Bolivia, Paraguay and more recently Brazil. In Ecuador, CONAIE has rebuilt its mass base (after the debacle of supporting pseudo-populist Gutierrez for president in 2002) and in alliance with mass urban trade unions has been effective in defeating the US-backed free trade agreement (ALCA) and canceling oil contracts with Occidental Petroleum, a US oil company. In Venezuela, there is a dual polarization: on the one hand between the working class and urban poor against the pro-US local landowners, business and media elite, and, on the other hand, within the broad spectrum of Chavez supporters, between wealthy state directors, elite bureaucrats, “national” business people and National Guard Generals and trade unions, landless farmers, urban slum-dwellers and underemployed “informal workers.” In Bolivia, the class contradictions remain mostly latent because of the “national polarization,” but find expression in the conflict between orthodox macro-economic policies of the Morales regime and the paltry pay increases given to low-paid educational, health and other public sector workers.



In countries where the polarization between Latin American nationalism and EU/US imperialism is strongest, the class struggle, at least temporarily, is subdued. In other words: the nationalist struggle subsumes the class struggle with the promise that greater national control will result in increased state resources and subsequently to redistributive measures.



In Brazil, class conflict has declined as a result of the subordination of the traditional trade union confederation (CUT) and, to a certain extent, the MST (Rural Landless Workers Movement) to the neoliberal Lula regime. Nevertheless, because of Lula’s savage reduction of public employees pensions and opposition to substantial wage and minimum wage increases, the trade unions representing public employees, metal workers and civil construction workers founded a new dynamic labor confederation, CONLUTA, in May 5-7, 2006. With over 2,700 delegates from 22 states representing nearly 1.8 million workers, CONLUTA represents an alternative social pole for the tens of millions of Brazilian workers and poor abandoned by Lula’s embrace of bankers, agro-business and foreign MNCs. CONLUTA has adopted a social-movement type of organization including employed and unemployed workers organizations, neighborhood and rural workers movements, students, women, ecology and landless workers organizations within its operating structure. Representation at the Congress was based on direct elections from democratic assemblies. The emergence of a new mass-based labor confederation represents the first major break within the neoliberal “center-left” Lula regime. As such it portends a revitalization of working class politics and poses a real alternative to the receding power of the pro-regime confederation.

Realities and Myths of International Tensions



There are great many misunderstandings and confusion both on the Right and Left regarding the nature of the conflicts between Latin American nationalists and US/EU states and multinational corporations. The first point of clarification is over the nature of the nationalist measures adopted by President Chavez of Venezuela and President Morales of Bolivia. Both regimes have not abolished most of the essential elements of capitalist production, namely private profits, foreign ownership, profit repatriation, market access or supply of gas, energy or other primary goods, nor have they outlawed future foreign investments.



In fact Venezuela’s huge Orinoco heavy oil fields, the richest reserves of oil in the world, are still owned by foreign capital. The controversy over President Chavez’ radical economic measures revolves around a tax and royalty increase from less than 15% to 33% -- a rate which is still below what is paid by oil companies in Canada, the Middle East and Africa. What produced the stream of vitriolic froth from the US and British media (Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, etc) was not a comparative analysis of contemporary tax and royalty rates, but a retrospective comparison to the virtually tax-free past. In fact Chavez and Morales are merely modernizing and updating petrol-nation state relations to present world standards; in a sense they are normalizing regulatory relations in the face of exceptional or windfall profits, resulting from corrupt agreements with complicit state executive officials. The harsh reaction of the US and EU governments and their energy MNCs is a result of having become habituated to thinking that exceptional privileges were the norm of “capitalist development” rather than the result of venal officials. As a result, they resisted the normalization of capitalist relations in Venezuela and Bolivia in which state-private joint ventures and profit sharing are common practices in most capitalist countries It is not surprising that the president of Royal Dutch Shell, Jeroen van der Veer, advised his oil colleagues that the nationalist position of oil rich countries and their redrawing of contracts is a “new reality” that international energy companies have to accept. Van der Veer, the realist, puts the nationalist reforms in perspective: “In Venezuela we were one of the first to renegotiate. Under the circumstances we are quite satisfied we can work our future there. We have harmony with the government, which is very important. In Bolivia, I assume we will come to a solution.” (Financial Times, May 13, 2006 page 9) Likewise Pan Andean Resources (PAR), an Irish gas and energy company, stated it could successfully operate in Bolivia following Morales’ “nationalization” declaration. David Horgan, President of PAR, in justifying a joint venture in gas with the Bolivians, stated, “We don’t really care what precedents it [PAR’s gas agreement with the Bolivian state] sets. What the majors [big oil companies] see as a problem, we see as an opportunity.” (Financial Times, May 13, 2006, p9)



In fact, in Bolivia on May 29, 2006, the Morales government will announce the winning bid to the world’s biggest private mining companies competing to exploit state-owned Mutun with 40 billion tons of iron ore. The new terms of the Bolivian government as outlined by its principle ideologue, Vice President Linera, provides judicial and stable guarantees for all investments, in exchange for profit sharing and joint management schemes. Clearly the big mining corporations are part of the “realist” school of reaping big profits from strategic high-priced raw materials in exchange for paying higher taxes and including Bolivian technocrats in their management team.



The major points of conflict are not capitalism’s aversion to socialism, nor even private ownership versus nationalization of property, let alone social revolution leading to an egalitarian society. The major conflicts are over: 1) Increases in taxation, prices and royalty payments, 2) the conversion of firms to joint ventures, 3) representation on corporate boards of directors, 4) distribution of shareholdings between foreign appointed and state-appointed executives, 5) the legal right to revise contracts, 6) compensation payments for presumed assets, and 7) management of distribution and export sales.



These proposed regulations and reforms may increase state reserves and influence but none of these points of conflict involve a revolutionary transformation of property or social relations of production. The proposed changes are reforms, which resonate with the policies undertaken by European social democratic parties between the late 1940s-1960s and by most of the world’s oil producing countries in the 1970s, including Arab monarchies and Islamic and secular republics. In fact earlier political regimes in both Venezuela (1976) and Bolivia (1952 and 1968) took far more radical measures in nationalizing petroleum and other mining sectors.



Venezuela has increased royalty and tax payments of international petroleum companies because they were far below global levels. Except for a few smaller operations that refused the new rules of the game and were expropriated, none of the biggest firms were seized, nor were worker-employer relations altered in the (PDVSA) state firm or in any of the foreign companies. Their conventional vertical structures remain intact as many rank and file trade unionists complain. Over the past three years all the major US/EU petrol firms operating in Venezuela have been earning record profits exceeding their historical highs by several billion (Euros or dollars). Bolivarian revolutionary discourses not withstanding, none of the oil majors have indicated any intention of abandoning their lucrative arrangements with the Venezuelan state, despite the heated rhetorical ejaculations emanating from Washington or Brussels.



The US and EU conflict with Venezuela is over politics and ideology as much as it is over the power and profits of their oil companies. They object that Venezuela’s mixed economy, higher tax model will replace the deregulated, low tax, privatization and denationalization model prevalent in Latin America since the 1970s and currently being promoted elsewhere (Libya, Iraq, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico). The key problem is that President Chavez, operating from a strong national economic and political base, resulting from the added oil resources, has argued for greater regional integration -- free of US/EU domination. This has provoked the ire of Washington and Brussels, as they fear that greater Latin American integration may limit future market and investment penetration. In world politics, Chavez’ embrace and defense of self-determination of all nations has put him in opposition to the US military intervention in Iraq, US/EU occupation of Afghanistan and their joint war threats against Iran. Chavez’ position is in part due to US involvement in a failed military coup in his country in 2002.



In summary the conflict is between democratically elected nationalist leaders supporting a mixed economy to finance social welfare, against US and EU empire building, interventionist policies intent on preserving the “Golden Age” of pillage of unregulated privatized economies and the MNCs’ excessively low tax payments in exploiting energy resources.



The burgeoning international conflict between Bolivia/Brazil, Spain/Argentina and their backers in the US/EU follows a similar pattern to Venezuela’s conflict with the US. First the attempt by the propagandists of the foreign oil corporations to portray President Morales as a “disciple” or “follower” of Chavez, and his nationalist policies as merely a genuflection of Chavez’s projections of power. There is no basis for claims of external machinations. Opposition and general strikes occurred throughout Bolivia during the privatization process in 1996, two years before Chavez was elected. Opposition to the private gas agreements intensified in 2003 via a popular uprising that overthrew the President (Sanchez de Losada) and called for the nationalization of gas and oil. In 2004 a referendum was approved by 80% of the electorate, which called for an increase in tax and royalty payments and state control. Unlike Venezuela, Morales faces intense pressure internally from all the trade unions and mass organizations to follow up his electoral promises. President Morales’ entire socio-economic reform programs and the political stability and legitimacy of his regime depends on securing additional tax revenues from the MNCs. Given the fact that he inherited a very large budget deficit and a substantial foreign debt (which he feels obligated to pay) and is committed to an IMF style austerity program, his only solution is more oil and gas revenue. Most important of all, given that Morales was elected on the basis of “bringing dignity to the Indian people,” he can not ignore the arrogance with which the petrol and gas companies defiantly shunted aside his initial proposals to negotiate new tax rates and joint ventures. With the financial and political backing of oil rich Venezuela, Morales declared “nationalization” as a pressure tactic to force the companies to negotiate. Just as President Chavez’ socio-economic policies were radicalized by the US supported military coup and executive elites’ oil lockout, Morales radicalized his tactics to secure economic concessions and serious negotiations from the gas and oil MNCs. The goal of Morales is to negotiate in good faith and to secure some type of profit sharing and tax increases. With continued intransigence from oil and gas companies, an “all or nothing” policy could radicalize the electoral base of his regime. “Those who make reforms impossible, make revolution inevitable.” Of course, Bolivia under Morales is very far from adopting a revolutionary anti-capitalist program. Even the increase in tax revenue to 82% is a “transitory” measure to be negotiated. Yet he has demonstrated a willingness to mobilize the state and extend its influence over the operations of the corporations. He has clearly established that the existing oil contracts are unconstitutional. By the second week of May, the major gas and oil companies still failed to recognize that they have more to gain from negotiating with Morales than heating up the social movements. At most, negotiations will likely result in an increase of tax and royalty revenues -- probably to 50%. The purchase price of gas would rise modestly, and some sort of joint state-private management accords would be signed. The Brazilian and EU political leaders and energy executives could move from “confrontation” to “negotiations” and co-optation. Instead Morales’ proposed joint ventures and mixed economy faces pressures from the IMF, Spanish Finance Minister Solbes, and Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorin to pay market value for any shares -- potentially bankrupting the state. Threats of judicial and diplomatic ruptures continue to be used to limit any effective state control over the gas enterprises. Meanwhile, Zapatero, Spanish Prime Minister and President Da Silva of Brazil, relying on negotiations, “insider” pressure and state aid, play the role of “good cop” in watering down even further Morales’ reforms.



Whatever the overall settlement, the key will be in the details: More specifically in the specific operational procedures, control over information, production and commercialization processes, where it can be expected that the incumbents executives will do every thing possible to undermine effective state control. While political and economic polarizations at the international level intensifies, an internal crisis is building up within the US. The military debacle in Iraq has led to two options: a withdrawal to rebuild imperial power, and plans for a new aerial war against Iran, to reclaim imperial power. A coalition led by the major pro-Israel organizations, the civilian Pentagon militarists, the majority of the mass media and a minority of the general public supports a military attack. In opposition stands a large proportion of retired military officials, leaders of the oil industry, the majority of Christian and Muslim organizations and a majority of the US public.



The multiple Middle East and South Asian wars and the rising internal discontent with the costs of war have substantially weakened the capacity of the US to engage in a full-scale intervention in Latin America. Instead it is forced to rely on its Latin American client regimes and European “allies” to isolate and weaken the nationalist Chavez and Morales governments and to contain the rising popular and electoral opposition in Mexico, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Brazil. The problem for Washington is that the current Latin American client presidents are weak or on the way out of office. By the end of 2006, almost all of Washington’s most servile client presidents will be out of office. In some cases political clones will replace them, but in others the newly elected leaders may be less given to provoking conflict with their nationalist neighbors.



Contrary to the euphoria of the US and Western European left, the new nationalist governments and Cuba face serious internal challenges from their very own supporters. While successfully countering imperialist pressures and increasing their tax revenues from foreign capital, they have neglected to implement social reforms of the utmost urgency to their supporters. Both Venezuela and Cuba, despite government promises, lag far behind in meeting the huge housing and transport deficit, and the efforts to diversify their economies lag far behind goals particularly in agro-industries (sugar to ethanol and local food production in Cuba; meat, poultry, fish and grains in Venezuela), manufacturing (especially arms, durables, IT and electronics) and processing of minerals. Moreover in Venezuela there are large sectors, perhaps 50%, of the labor force, with improved access to free social services but which are employed in the low-paid “informal sector.” In Bolivia, Morales has announced a land reform program, which will be based on expropriating underutilized land, excluding the large profitable productive agro-business estates in Santa Cruz’s fertile plains. Instead he emphasizes distributing less fertile state lands far from markets and roads. The key to the success of agrarian reform will depend on the procedure of implementation and adjudication and the availability of credit and technical assistance. Moreover Morales’s salary and income policy is only marginally better than his liberal predecessors: wage and salary increases for teachers and other public sector workers are less than 5% over the rate of inflation. His promise to double the minimum wage from $50 to $100 dollars a month has been repudiated in favor of a $6 dollar raise. In other words, if the international polarization is not backed by internal redistributive policies affecting wealth and assets of the very rich, both in Venezuela and Bolivia, strategically important popular sectors necessary for support in any serious international confrontations could be alienated. Grandiose international gestures, humanitarian solidarity and anti-imperialist policies are no substitute for deepening internal structural changes and meeting essential domestic demands for housing, jobs and higher salaries.


Class and Regional Polarization and Crisis in Bolivia


If, as we have argued, the emerging polarization in Latin America is between imperial-centered neoliberal regimes and reformist nationalist populists, it follows that the successful resolution of this conflict depends in part on the premises of the reformist strategists -- their belief that socio-economic reforms are compatible with national capitalist development. In the case of President Morales, I would argue that his electoral-programmatic political strategy dictated his political and socio-economic analysis. The premises of Morales’ reform policies were dictated by several dubious premises: 1) the belief that “productive” capital can be separated from “unproductive” capital, and hence that a land reform confined to and affecting only “unexploited land” or “land without a socio-economic function” would not generate elite opposition and would be compatible with a multi-class electoral coalition. This has proven incorrect: the large “productive” landowners vehemently oppose the land reform and are supported by business and banking elites, especially in Santa Cruz, because they have diverse investment holdings which cross sectoral boundaries (including banks, industry, productive land for exports and unproductive lands held for speculation).



The second false premise of President Morales’ reform strategy is based on a mistaken diagnosis of the “dichotomy” between foreign and national capital. President Morales believes that by “nationalizing”, or more precisely converting foreign-owned petrol and gas companies into joint state-private enterprises, he could finance national capitalist development thus securing their support. This “analysis” totally underestimated the economic and political links between large and medium-sized enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises. Many Bolivian firms are suppliers, subcontractors and importers dependent on foreign markets, credit and financing from foreign MNCs and regimes. It is not surprising that both the political opposition in Congress and the major Bolivian business groups have opposed Morales’ national reforms -- despite the fact that they are the promised beneficiaries.



The third false premise of President Morales reformist-nationalist strategy is the idea that the so-called “center-left” regimes in Brazil, Argentina and Spain would be willing to negotiate and accept modifications in the exploitation contracts of their multinationals and accept modest increases in the prices of gas purchases. Morales overestimated the effectiveness of his “personal diplomacy” and ideological affinity with Lula in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina and Zapatero in Spain and completely underestimated their powerful and durable ties to their MNCs. As a result, Lula’s regime has rejected all of Morales’ proposals, including his offer to negotiate a two-dollar increase in gas prices, let alone his proposal of a joint venture with Petrobras. Likewise, Kirchner’s regime in Argentina has postponed several meetings to discuss a similar price increase in gas, and his representative has set no new date to even discuss the proposal. Zapatero, backed by the IMF, has insisted that any Spanish holdings (REPSOL oil and gas, BBV) be fully and promptly compensated, an impossible task given Bolivia’s budgetary constraints.



It is the greatest irony that while “center-left” Presidents -- Kirchner, Lula and Zapatero -- reject Morales’ proposals to increase Bolivia’s tax revenues on their MNCs, the reactionary US Congress approved legislation to increase the government’s share of oil profits by $20 billion dollars. (Financial Times p3, May 20-21, 2006) Moreover while the US pays $6 dollars per thousand cubic feet of gas, Lula and Kirchner object to Morales proposal to increase the price to $5 dollars per thousand cubic feet. With “friends of the Bolivian people” like these, who needs imperialists to exploit the poorest country in Latin America?



In summary, all of Morales’ political assumptions were based on “imagined facts” which do not correspond to the economic and political realities in which they are projected. The absence of a serious empirical analysis of structural realities has resulted in imposing an electoral strategy based on a multi-class political alliance onto a class/imperial-polarized world. Morales’ reformist ideology “created” an illusory vision of the political world in which he would unite “productive capitalists,” friendly center-left regimes, workers and peasants against “unproductive landowners” and corrupt MNCs, in pursuit of a mixed economy, a balanced budget and incremental social reforms.

The current impasse facing Morales, imposed by his unwilling “partners”, poses a serious dilemma for his regime and his international allies (Venezuela and Cuba): If the reformist program is not viable, should he further dilute his “nationalist” agenda and retain the semblance of a “progressive regime” or should he radicalize his program, drawing on the support of his international allies in a deeper continental confrontation?

James Petras, a former Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York, owns a 50-year membership in the class struggle, is an adviser to the landless and jobless in Brazil and Argentina, and is co-author of Globalization Unmasked (Zed). His book with Henry Veltmeyer, Social Movements and State Power: Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, was published in October 2005. He can be reached at: jpetras@binghamton.edu.